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ESSAY
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MACHINE
Dorothy S. Lund* & Elizabeth Pollman**
The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral
set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We
demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: For public companies
in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist
orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance
machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate
governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This
relationship is reﬂected in the common refrain of “good governance” that
pervades contemporary discourse and the maturation of corporate governance as an industry oriented toward serving shareholders and their
interests. As for the present, our analysis explains why the corporate social
responsibility movement transformed into shareholder value–oriented
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, stakeholder
capitalism became relegated to a new separate form of entity known as
the beneﬁt corporation, and public company boards of directors became
homogenized across industries. As for the future, our analysis suggests
that absent a major paradigm shift that would force multiple
institutional gatekeepers to switch their orientation, advocacy pushing
corporations to consider the interests of employees, communities, and the
environment will likely fail unless such effort is framed as advancing
shareholder interests.
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INTRODUCTION
In a time of climate change, racial and economic inequality, and crisis
stemming from the global pandemic, corporations are alternately
maligned for their conduct and embraced as a solution for change.
Observers have increasingly excoriated the traditional view of corporate
purpose—that corporations should be managed for the beneﬁt of shareholders and, speciﬁcally, to maximize shareholder wealth—as contributing to societal problems.1 Spurred by this debate, and only two decades
after prominent scholars announced “the end of history” in favor of shareholder primacy,2 luminaries in the ﬁeld are again asking these central
questions of corporate law: For whom is the corporation managed?3 Do
ﬁduciaries owe a duty to maximize shareholder value or may they prioritize
the interests of other stakeholders?
We contribute to this important debate by enlarging the aperture.
Speciﬁcally, we provide an original descriptive account of the “corporate
governance machine”—a complex governance system in the United States
composed of law, institutions, and culture that orients corporate decisionmaking toward shareholders. We describe the key players in the system
and show how the machine powerfully drives corporate behavior and
inﬂuences corporate regulation.
In so doing, we make three primary contributions. First, we provide a
holistic account of the contemporary U.S. corporate governance infrastructure and show how it solidiﬁes corporate purpose as promoting shareholder interests. Although legal academics have generally focused on
corporate law as a key determinant of purpose, our analysis reveals that
this element may well be the least important: A vast array of institutional
players—proxy advisors, stock exchanges, ratings agencies, institutional

1. See, e.g., Colin Mayer, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the Greater Good 31–45
(2018) (arguing that shareholder wealth maximization is a fundamentally ﬂawed understanding of corporate purpose).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
Geo. L.J. 439, 440–42 (2001). Scholars have used the term “shareholder primacy” to refer
to two different concepts, reﬂecting the ends and means or purpose and power of corporations: (1) that corporations are, or should be, managed in the interests of shareholders; and
(2) that shareholders have, or should have, ultimate control over the corporation. Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 547, 573 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Robert B.
Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations, 71 Bus. Law. 381, 387–
88 (2016) [hereinafter Thompson, Anti-Primacy]. We primarily use the term descriptively
in the ﬁrst sense.
3. For a sampling of this literature, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto
Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 Cornell L. Rev. 91 (2020);
Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 Tex. L.
Rev. 1309 (2021); Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The
Debate Over Corporate Purpose, 76 Bus. Law. 363 (2021) [hereinafter Rock, Debate Over
Corporate Purpose].
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investors, and associations—enshrine shareholder primacy in public markets.4 Indeed, we show the very concept of corporate governance promoted by these players developed alongside the principal-agent model of
the corporation, such that “good governance” is often equated with minimizing agency costs in the pursuit of shareholder value.5 Professional
education, the media, and politics further reinforce this cultural
understanding.6
We also explore examples that demonstrate the machine’s inﬂuence
over important aspects of public company governance. Corporate social
responsibility, for example, was once framed in moral terms as a goal for
management irrespective of proﬁt.7 But after several decades of circulation
within the machine, the idea of corporate social responsibility has been
largely replaced with investor-driven environmental, social, and governance (ESG). Today many companies pursue ESG goals, and many investors
favor ESG funds, not for moral reasons or a prosocial willingness to sacriﬁce proﬁts, but because ESG is thought to provide sustainable long-term
value or higher risk-adjusted returns for shareholders.8 This reframing has
in turn shaped managerial decisionmaking about the kinds of ESG activity
in which corporations should engage. As the corporate governance
machine transformed corporate social responsibility into value-enhancing
ESG, it has also pushed social purpose beyond this framing into an entirely
different form of corporation—the beneﬁt corporation—which we show
is also driven by shareholders and their values.9
Second, we look to the consequences of the corporate governance
machine’s workings and posit that its shareholderist orientation is potentially suboptimal. When shareholderism is locked into rules, norms, and
power structures, superior governance arrangements from a social welfare
perspective may be discouraged or taken off the table.10 From convergence
on one-size-ﬁts-all governance “best practices” to reduced corporate governance innovation, we identify a range of negative implications for
corporate law and governance wrought by this system.11
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra section II.C.
7. See infra section I.B.
8. See infra notes 216–226 and accompanying text.
9. See infra section III.C.
10. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
641, 648 (1996) [hereinafter Roe, Chaos and Evolution] (explaining how path dependence
can “permit structures that were once satisfactory to become inefficient but not be worth
changing” due to the high costs of switching).
11. See infra Part IV. The resulting lack of diversity in governance might fall short of
the expectations of contractarian scholars as well as those who recognize that network beneﬁts can accrue from common use and advocate for a menu approach to corporate law. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 5, 34
(1991) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Economic Structure of Corporate Law] (stating
that “[n]o set of promises is right for all ﬁrms” and arguing that corporate law’s purpose is
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Third, and ﬁnally, this “meta” account of the U.S. corporate governance system elucidates much about the path of corporate governance
reform and the success of the stakeholder governance movement in particular. At the outset, we show how over the past several decades, law,
institutions, and culture have entrenched a shareholder-oriented view in
corporate law and governance. Battles over the allocation of power within
the corporation occur on policy issues such as proxy access and shareholder proposals, but the larger war has been won. We predict that legal
reform and soft law standards will continue to be ﬁltered through this lens,
and stakeholder-oriented reforms that are framed as beneﬁtting shareholders will have a chance of survival and indeed, be increasingly
embraced. As evidence, recall that the ESG movement took off when it was
framed in terms of shareholder value. Consider, too, the evolution in
corporate purpose away from share price maximization and toward “longterm shareholder value” or even “shareholder welfare” maximization.12 In
many ways, these developments soften the hard edges of shareholder
primacy, but this evolution is itself a legacy of the corporate governance
machine: Those who wish to change corporate decisionmaking are forced
to do so within the bounds of shareholderism.
What does this mean for the future of corporate governance? On the
one hand, absent a large shock to the system, such as a major federal
intervention that would force multiple institutional gatekeepers to change
their orientation,13 the corporate governance machine will likely impede
to provide efficient default rules that can be customized); Michael Klausner, The
Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. Corp. L. 779, 797 (2006)
(“Corporate law can . . . promote innovation and customization by providing menus of
alternative governance structures that ﬁrms can adopt in standardized form by designating
in their charters that they choose to do so.”).
12. See Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124
Yale L.J. 1554, 1565 (2015) (observing that “as a matter of economic theory, the effect of
managers’ time horizons (that is, whether managers serve short-term or long-term
shareholders) on stakeholder welfare is actually indeterminate”); Frank Partnoy, Speciﬁcity
and Time Horizons, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 525, 533 (2018) (arguing that stakeholder
advocates should articulate an optimal time horizon for ﬁrm managers to use, as well as the
grounds for concluding it is optimal); see also Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened
Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide,
36 J. Corp. L. 59, 62 (2010) [hereinafter Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value]
(discussing the concept of “enlightened shareholder value” that views attention to
stakeholder interests “as a means of generating long-term shareholder wealth and
improving portfolio- and ﬁrm-level risk assessment”); Ann M. Lipton, What We Talk About
When We Talk About Shareholder Primacy, 69 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 863, 866–67 (2019)
[hereinafter Lipton, Shareholder Primacy] (discussing how most scholarly discourse
equates shareholder primacy with wealth maximization, but recent literature has described
it in terms of welfare or values that shareholders determine for themselves).
13. Although the COVID-19 pandemic could prove a catalyst, the emerging consensus
is that it will not likely result in sweeping change to corporate and securities law. See, e.g.,
Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Law’s Critical Junctures,
Bus. Law. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 72–76), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3877329
[https://perma.cc/K8YJ-Z5BN] (“[W]hile the possibility that corporate America will
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a true paradigm shift away from shareholderism. On the other hand, our
account reveals how incremental change could take place. As shifts in
understanding regarding the merits of various ESG initiatives occur
through cultural and market forces, the promotion of stakeholder interests can be reconciled with pursuing long-term shareholder value. For
example, institutional investors and asset managers that hold diversiﬁed
portfolios increasingly recognize the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of mitigating climate change risk.14 Likewise, corporate sustainability initiatives can protect undiversiﬁed investors against downside risk.15 To the extent that ESG
metrics become easier to measure and disclose, more of such activity might
occur and a greater number of investors might support it. Notably, however, this future change is likely to occur through the existing shareholderist model, which limits acceptable rationales and favors activity that can
be reduced to measurable metrics tied to risk or ﬁnancial value.16
Part I traces the historical and intellectual underpinnings of corporate governance and charts its rise alongside the shareholder primacy
movement. Part II provides an original descriptive account of the U.S. system of corporate governance and its components, showing how law, institutions, and culture enmesh shareholderism at public corporations. Part
III explores how the corporate governance machine works using three
examples. It describes how the machine has transformed public company
boards, shaped the shift from corporate social responsibility to investordriven ESG, and led to the development of a new form of business organization—the beneﬁt corporation. Part IV examines the broader implications of this analysis for the debate about corporate purpose and other
pressing debates in corporate law. It concludes with predictions about the
future of corporate governance.

ultimately suffer a reputational black eye due to the COVID-19 pandemic cannot be
discounted, as matters stand the culpability that has accompanied previous corporate law
critical junctures is absent.”).
14. Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 6
(2020); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship 3–5, 24 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Law Working Paper No. 566/2021, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782814
[https://perma.cc/4LHL-JT8A] [hereinafter Gordon, Systematic Stewardship].
15. Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 Vand. L. Rev.
1401, 1410 (2020); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG,
Perfect Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and
Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106 Iowa L. Rev. 1885, 1888 (2021).
16. An even greater incorporation of stakeholder interests could occur if shareholders
were understood to be individuals with diverse preferences, including ethical and social
concerns. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder
Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 247, 270 (2017) (arguing that “shareholder
welfare and market value are not the same, and that companies should maximize the former
not the latter”). Such an approach would require developing improved means to aggregate
shareholder preferences.
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I. THE CONCURRENT RISE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY
This Part begins by tracing the coinage of the term “corporate governance” and the context of its conception, and then continues by charting its rise alongside the widespread adoption of shareholder primacy. In
so doing, this Part lays the historical foundation for understanding the law,
institutions, and culture that make up the modern corporate governance
machine. It observes a connection between the term “corporate governance” as it became used in the 1970s and the rise of the shareholder primacy movement that became the dominant paradigm. This relationship is
reﬂected in the common refrain of “good governance” that pervades contemporary discourse and the maturation of corporate governance as an
industry, oriented toward serving shareholders and their interests.
A.

The Path to Corporate Governance

To start, for as long as the corporate form has existed, issues of corporate governance have emerged, although observers at the time did not
refer to the issues in those terms. Legal historians commonly pinpoint the
1920s and ’30s as the foundational era for early debates.17 The industrial
developments leading up to this time had transformed the economic landscape. The great merger movement starting in the late nineteenth century
generated large-scale enterprises and, in turn, created a large number of
small shareholders who fueled the growth of the New York Stock
Exchange.18 By the 1920s, millions of Americans had become ﬁrst-time
investors.19

17. See, e.g., Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 Seattle U. L. Rev.
1247, 1247–49 (2010) [hereinafter Wells, Birth of Corporate Governance] (examining the
concept of “corporate governance” and arguing “for dating the concept’s origins to the
debates of the 1920s”). For an example of earlier discussion of the problems created by the
separation of ownership and control, see Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations 193 (1776) (“The directors of such companies, however,
being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be
expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.”).
18. See Wells, Birth of Corporate Governance, supra note 18, at 1253–54; see also
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
340–44 (1977); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business,
1895–1904, at 1–2 (1985); Mary O’Sullivan, The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885–
1930: Historical Facts and Theoretical Fashions, 8 Enter. & Soc’y 489, 489 (2007).
19. See Julia Cathleen Ott, When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an
Investors’ Democracy and the Emergence of the Retail Investor in the United States, 1890–
1930, 9 Enter. & Soc’y 619, 620 (2008) (estimating that the percentage of U.S. households
owning stock rose from approximately 3% to 25% in the early 1900s). The trend accelerated
during World War I with great numbers of Americans buying Liberty Bonds to help fund
the war. David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society 105–06
(1980); see also Wells, Birth of Corporate Governance, supra note 18, at 1265.
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Amidst this growth in the shareholder class, as well as economic and
regulatory upheaval,20 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their
1932 landmark book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.21
Building on earlier thinkers, Berle and Means documented the rise of
large corporations with dispersed stock and the weakening of shareholder
control.22 But instead of concluding the solution was to reestablish
shareholder power as it had existed before the rise of giant industrial
companies, they highlighted that the transformation of American
capitalism called for a more profound rethinking of “the ends for which
the modern corporation can be or will be run.”23 The work was an instant
classic—orienting corporate law and theory around the issue of the
separation of ownership and control but without elevating the importance
of shareholders in the balance.24
The vision of corporate managers as socially responsive trustees came
to fruition as the economy recovered after World War II.25 By the midtwentieth century, “managerial capitalism” reached its zenith, in which
“neither boards nor shareholders acted as a robust check on potentially
20. For example, after the stock market crash of 1929 and during the ensuing Great
Depression, Congress successively passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act
of 1934, creating a framework of federal securities regulation based on a philosophy of disclosure and establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with a “mission of
protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating
capital formation.” What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/Z8ED-G4QQ] [hereinafter SEC, What We Do] (last visited Aug. 21,
2021); see also Louis Loss, Joel Seligman & Troy A. Paredes, Securities Regulation 301–04,
(6th ed. 2019).
21. Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932).
22. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law: 1836–1937, at 16, 357
(1991) (discussing the argument of Berle and Means “that an inherent attribute of the modern business corporation was the separation of ownership and control”); Wells, Birth of
Corporate Governance, supra note 18, at 1289 (discussing the ﬁndings of Berle and Means
concerning shareholder disempowerment and the separation of ownership and control);
see also Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of its Future, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1611,
1612 (1981) (discussing the separation of ownership and control as a longstanding feature
of American corporations).
23. Berle & Means, supra note 22, at 7–9.
24. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. Corp. L. 99, 120 (2008) (discussing
the work’s suggestion that the separation of ownership and control might reﬂect a “transformation of corporate proﬁts from purely private property to property touched with a public interest”); see also James P. Hawley & Andrew T. Williams, The Rise of Fiduciary
Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic 42
(2000) (“The phenomenon Berle and Means identiﬁed in 1932—the divorce of ownership
and control—would come to dominate most thinking about issues of corporate governance
for the rest of the twentieth century.”).
25. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Competitive Performance of U.S. Industrial
Enterprises Since the Second World War, 68 Bus. Hist. Rev. 1, 14 (“By the 1950s, full-time
salaried managers, with little equity in the enterprises they operated, were making nearly all
operating and strategic decisions.”).
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wayward executives.”26 Stock ownership was widely dispersed and shareholders lacked the incentive, information, and expertise to exercise voice
or provide oversight.27 Boards dominated by full-time insiders led the nominating process to reelect themselves and ﬁll the remaining seats.28
Managers were instead checked by what economist John Kenneth
Galbraith termed “countervailing power.”29 This force consisted of “industry-level regulation, robust antitrust enforcement, fears of additional
heavy-handed government intrusions, powerful unions, and a banking sector reluctant to back risky corporate ventures.”30 Further, corporate managers, “mindful of intense criticism of business in the Depression, took
pains to emphasize the good citizenship of the ﬁrms they ran.”31 It was
during this period that the term “corporate governance” ﬁrst arose—by a
business ethicist advocating for the notion of a “well-tempered corporation” and calling for “a theory of corporate governance consistent with the
ideals of a democratic society.”32
B.

The Birth of Two Concepts

The 1970s mark the key inﬂection point that started to turn the tide
away from managerial capitalism and set in motion our contemporary system.33 Early in this trajectory came the spread of the term “corporate governance” beyond its academic origins—it ﬁrst appeared in the New York
26. Brian R. Cheffins, The Public Company Transformed 37 (2019) [hereinafter
Cheffins, Public Company Transformed].
27. Id. at 40.
28. See id. (“Full-time managers held a substantial proportion of board seats, and chief
executives would inﬂuence choices for the remaining directorships by shaping boardroom
discussion about the directorial nominees to be put before the shareholders.”).
29. See generally John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of
Countervailing Power, at ix (rev. ed. 1993) (asserting “[t]he core thesis that an established
and effective answer to economic power is the building of countervailing power”).
30. See Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 37.
31. Id. at 5; see also Peter F. Drucker, The Responsibilities of Management, Harper’s
Mag., Nov. 1954, at 67 (observing a “trend among managers to think of themselves almost
as public servants, not men driven by a ruthless craving for proﬁts”).
32. See Richard Eells, The Government of Corporations, at vii (1962) [hereinafter
Eells, Government of Corporations] (“I have tried to emphasize, in this ﬁrst general
treatment of the subject of corporate governance, the importance of constitutionalism as
applied to business polities.”); Richard Eells, The Meaning of Modern Business: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise 52, 336 (1960) (discussing
the “well-tempered corporation”); see also Bernard Mees, Corporate Governance as a
Reform Movement, 21 J. Mgmt. Hist. 194, 195 (2015) (attributing the origins of the term
corporate governance to Richard Eells); Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance
Obsession, 42 J. Corp. L. 359, 373 n.69 (2016) [hereinafter Pargendler, Corporate
Governance Obsession] (same).
33. See Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 101–02 (observing
“the 1970s provided the platform for change, an inﬂection point for the postwar industrial
system’” (quoting Rakesh Kurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social
Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulﬁlled Promise of Management
as a Profession 297 (2007))); Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of
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Times in 197234 and within a few years also appeared in the Federal
Register.35 It was no coincidence that this new term came into common
usage during the 1970s. One of the great U.S. public companies, Penn
Central, collapsed with revelations of commercial bribery, resulting at the
time in the “single largest bankruptcy in [the] nation’s history.”36
Moreover, around the same time, it came to light that over 350 public
corporations had engaged in illicit payments.37 For years, “the business
pages of American newspapers . . . carried a continuing story of corporate
misconduct,” and the public grew disillusioned with big business.38 The
stock market was producing dismal returns, leading a major business
publication to report “The Death of Equities.”39
Stemming from an analogy between the government and the corporation, corporate governance expressed the notion that limitations on corporate power or misconduct could come through internal constraints.40
Public-interest activist Ralph Nader, for example, argued that “if corporate
governance is to be reformed, it must begin by returning the board to [its]
historical role” as “an internal auditor of the corporation, responsible for
constraining executive management from violations of law and breach of
trust.”41 Likening the board to “a rival branch of government,” he argued
this reform was necessary because the “autocratic power” of executives
“led to recurring violations of law, conﬂicts of interest, productive inefficiency, and pervasive harm to consumers, workers, and the community
environment.”42 For different reasons, both the political left and right

Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1169, 1172
(2013) [hereinafter Stout, Rise of Shareholder Primacy] (noting managerial capitalism ran
“into headwinds” by the early 1970s).
34. Pargendler, Corporate Governance Obsession, supra note 33, at 373.
35. Id.
36. Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 37; SEC, The Financial
Collapse of the Penn Central Company: Staff Report of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, at iii (1972),
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ﬁles/docs/historical/
house/1972house_ﬁncolpenncentral.pdf [https://perma.cc/76J6-27GH].
37. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1102–03 (1977)
[hereinafter Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry].
38. Id. at 1101; see also Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 105.
39. Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 104–05 (citing The
Death of Equities: How Inﬂation Is Destroying the Stock Market, Bus. Wk., Aug. 1979, at
64).
40. See Eells, Government of Corporations, supra note 33, at 184–210 (outlining the
analogy between the pursuit of government policy and the pursuit of corporate policy);
Pargendler, Corporate Governance Obsession, supra note 33, at 374 (“[T]he emerging view
once again was that limitations on corporate power should come from within the corporation . . . and . . . cure its apparent failings through internal checks on misconduct.”).
41. Ralph Nader, Mark Green & Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation: How
the Largest Corporations Control Our Lives 119 (1976).
42. Id. at 119, 122.
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embraced this analogy of controlling managerial power through internal
government-like checks and balances.43
Notably, this early usage of corporate governance captured the division or balance of power among a particular set of participants—the board
of directors, executives, and shareholders. At ﬁrst, this discourse simply
reﬂected the “received legal model of the corporation” and the era of
managerial capitalism that was at its end.44 For example, in 1976, corporate
law scholar Melvin Eisenberg published a widely cited book setting out the
legal structure under which “the board of directors manages the corporation’s business and makes business policy; the officers act as agents of the
board and executive its decisions; and the shareholders elect the board.”45
Without using the term “corporate governance,” he critically observed
that in practice, managerial power was vested in the executives and that
shareholder voting was an empty formality.46 He advocated for boards to
serve a strong monitoring role.47
The same year, economist Michael Jensen and business school dean
William Meckling injected the economic concept of agency costs into
debate about corporations.48 Jensen and Meckling asserted that “the relationship between the stockholders and manager of a corporation ﬁt the
deﬁnition of a pure agency relationship.”49 In this vision, the divergence
of interests between the shareholders and corporate managers became
“agency costs” to be minimized.50 The corporation itself disappeared as a
43. William W. Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare, 74 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 767, 775–77 (2017) [hereinafter Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law
and Social Welfare] (detailing the rise of the political left’s American Corporate
Responsibility Movement); Pargendler, Corporate Governance Obsession, supra note 33, at
375 (discussing how conservative business associations have conceded that “the public
should be concerned that private business organizations like government itself be subject to
checks and balances”); see also Robert Hessen, In Defense of the Corporation, at xiv, xvii
(1979) (presenting a neoclassical view that “corporations are created and sustained entirely
by an exercise of individual rights, speciﬁcally freedom of association and freedom of contract” and “should be held to exactly the same standards of conduct and accountability as
everyone else”); Nader et al., supra note 42, at 8–9 (arguing that the “private governments
of the megacorporations” should be made more democratic and responsive to “public
needs”).
44. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 2
(1976).
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id. at 97–104, 139–41.
47. Id.; see also infra section III.A.
48. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 305 (1976); see also
Bratton, The Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare, supra note 44, at 777
(observing that the terms “agency costs” and “corporate governance” came into usage “in
tandem”); Stout, Rise of Shareholder Primacy, supra note 34, at 1173 (describing how “managerial capitalism fell into academic disrepute” in “the decades following the publication of
Jensen and Meckling’s article” and was replaced with “shareholder primacy”).
49. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 49, at 309.
50. Id.
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mere “legal ﬁction” and “nexus” for contracting.51 In all, the principalagent model provided the simple, sticky idea that had been lacking—“a
workable model of how a corporation behaves internally.”52
A normative overlay of what constitutes “good” corporate governance
swiftly emerged and came to dominate debates in law and business.53
Scholars imported economic concepts into corporate law and added a normative lens, mixing the term corporate governance with the principalagent model. In 1982, for example, Professor Daniel Fischel wrote in The
Corporate Governance Movement: “As residual claimants on the ﬁrm’s
income stream, shareholders want their agents—the ﬁrm’s managers—to
maximize wealth.”54 Fischel suggested that corporate law, contracting, and
markets provided the necessary governance mechanisms to respond to the
agency costs “inherent” in the corporate form.55 Corporations could hire
directors as “monitors” and “managerial contracts can provide managers
with incentives to maximize shareholders’ welfare,” such as by tying manager’s compensation to the company’s share price.56 According to this theory, focusing management attention on shareholder wealth would best
maximize corporate value and also social welfare, as other bodies of law
could regulate corporate externalities that would harm the public.57
In sum, while at the start of the 1970s the term corporate governance
had initially connoted “a political structure to be governed,”58 embraced
by those “taming the giant corporation” in the public interest,59 by the
early 1980s, louder voices had started to prevail in focusing the term’s
meaning on reducing agency costs to serve shareholder interests.
Corporate governance underwent a “revolution” toward the “monitoring
model.”60 Further, scholars began to embrace characterizations of corporate social responsibility as an ill-conceived basis for business regulation or
management.61 Milton Friedman’s view—that the corporation has “only

51. See id. at 310.
52. See Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry, supra note 38, at 1109–10 (noting in a
1977 article the lack of such a workable model and how “corporate practitioners and legal
academicians tend to view the corporation as a ‘black box’”).
53. See Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 5 (“Under the mantle of better ‘corporate governance,’ a term rarely used before the mid-1970s, ‘internal’ constraints had been strengthened since the heyday of managerial capitalism.”).
54. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259,
1262 (1982).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1263.
57. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 1416, 1436 (1989).
58. Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial
Crisis, 16 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 6 (2015).
59. See Nader et al., supra note 42.
60. George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring
Board, and the Director’s Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 623, 623 (1981).
61. Fischel, supra note 55, at 1268–73.
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one social responsibility . . . to increase its proﬁt so long as it stays within
the rules of the game”62—gained adherents.
C.

The Reign of Shareholder Primacy and Good Governance

The birth of corporate governance and its linkage with shareholder
primacy became the dominant mode of discourse in the decades that followed. During the Deal Decade of the 1980s, terminology and concepts
that might have remained in a dusty corner of the ivory tower were instead
thrust into the limelight as a record number of unsolicited tender offers
became proof of a “market for corporate control” and sharpened managers’ focus on producing “shareholder value” lest they become a target.63
Rapid growth in share ownership by institutional investors reinforced this
dynamic of pressure on public company boards and executives as large
shareholders expressed their enthusiasm for takeover bids.64 In contrast to
the considerable autonomy that boards and executives had enjoyed in previous times, during this period of frenzied M&A activity, management
“found themselves under a novel, heavy onus to respond to shareholder
preferences.”65 Blockbuster cases in Delaware courts on directors’ ﬁduciary duties in the sale context such as Smith v. Van Gorkom66 and Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.67 reﬂected the shift in thinking
toward agency theory and a monitoring board that served shareholders.
A clear sign of a shifting tide away from managerial capitalism and
toward shareholder primacy can be found in the ensuing debate about
whether boards should consider the interests of groups other than shareholders when determining whether to defend against a hostile takeover.
During this time, employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities
became “stakeholders” and “constituencies.”68 Whereas earlier references
62. See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business
Is to Increase Its Proﬁts, N.Y. Times Mag., Sept. 13, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/
1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom
133 (1962)).
63. See Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 151, 155–56, 162–
64, 181.
64. Id. at 196.
65. Id. at 156, 212; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Stop Blaming Milton Friedman!, 98
Wash. U. L. Rev. 1607, 1611–13, 1628–33 (2021) (explaining that the intellectual underpinnings from the 1970s for shareholder primacy took hold during the hostile takeover wave
of the 1980s).
66. 488 A.2d 858, 874–78 (Del. 1985) (holding that the directors breached the ﬁduciary duty of care in approving a cash-out merger because, among other things, the board did
not make an informed business judgment about the value of the company).
67. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (holding that when “the break-up of the company
was inevitable,” the “duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of [the
company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ beneﬁt”).
68. See id. at 176 (“[W]e address for the ﬁrst time the extent to which a corporation
may consider the impact of a takeover threat on constituencies other than shareholders.”);
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had highlighted the essential support that stakeholders provided to corporations,69 in the 1980s this terminology began to treat as “other” the corporate participants who did not hold equity.70 At the same time,
shareholders were consistently given precedence: Only two public corporations used the term “shareholder value” in annual reports before 1983,
but by 1985, over ﬁfty did so and a majority of CEOs surveyed said that
creating shareholder value was their top priority.71
Thus, by the end of the 1980s, the separation of ownership and control became “the master problem,”72 and pursuing shareholder value was
regularly identiﬁed as a core corporate objective.73 In addition, the term
“corporate governance” exploded in use, most typically in regard to corporate boards, executive performance, and shareholder involvement.74 A
congressional report aptly summarized: “While the corporate reformers of
the 1970s urged that ‘accountability’ meant being a good corporate citizen
answerable to society as a whole, observers might now suggest that
‘accountability’ in the 1980s means keeping stock prices high for
stockholders . . . .”75
Furthermore, during this time, shareholder primacy came to represent more than a directive for boards and managers to serve shareholders
by maximizing share price. Some proponents additionally argued that

John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 435, 440 (discussing the “conﬂict over
takeovers” that “divides shareholders and stakeholders”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics
and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 923, 979 (1984) (examining arguments for
corporate law reform including the interests of “‘other constituencies,’ which include
employees and local communities” (quoting Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s
Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 104 (1979))) [hereinafter Romano, Metapolitics].
69. R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New
Perspective on Corporate Governance, 25 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 88, 89 (1983) (noting that the
term “stakeholders” originated in a 1963 Stanford Research Institute memorandum to
describe “those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist”).
70. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy”, Acct. Econ. &
L., June 2012, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Stout, New Thinking] (“Some commentators continued
to argue valiantly for a more stakeholder-friendly view of the public corporation, but they
were increasingly dismissed as sentimental, sandals-wearing leftists whose hearts outweighed
their heads.”).
71. Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 187.
72. Id. at 182; Romano, Metapolitics, supra note 69, at 923. For a discussion of the costs
of collective decisionmaking and its bearing on ﬁrm structure and ownership patterns,
including the dominance of investor-owned enterprise, see Henry Hansmann, The
Ownership of Enterprise 53–65 (1996) [hereinafter Hansmann, Ownership of Enterprise].
73. Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 186.
74. Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance, 40
Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 8 (2015) (“By the end of the 1990s, ‘corporate governance’ had become
the term of art most typically used to characterize the analysis of boards, executive pay, and
shareholder involvement in publicly traded companies.”).
75. H.R. Subcomm. on Telecomms., Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy
& Com., 99th Cong., Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications for the Economy and
Corporate Governance 77 (Comm. Print 1987).
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shareholders should have greater power in the corporation.76 Shareholder
primacy therefore came to encompass both the “ends” of corporate decisionmaking—i.e., that the purpose of corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth—as well as the means.77 Although the former conception
gained greater adherence, in various degrees these two visions of shareholder primacy fueled the next several decades of governance reform.
Boards overhauled their CEO compensation practices to “pay for performance,” giving executives equity-based compensation to align their interests with shareholders.78 Executives focused their attention on investor
expectations and quarterly earnings.79 Despite the lack of conclusive
empirical support, “best practices” for “good governance” spread, such as
separating the roles of CEO and chairperson, eliminating staggered
boards, and adopting majority voting.80 In the twenty-ﬁrst century, as
hostile takeovers and the market for corporate control waned, activist
shareholders emerged to push for these changes under the governance
mantle and often with the aim of pursuing their own proﬁts.81 The rise of
investing through intermediaries ampliﬁed the potential for shareholder
inﬂuence as stock ownership became increasingly concentrated in a small
number of mutual funds and other institutions.82

76. See Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum
Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 1033, 1089 (2015) [hereinafter
Wells, A Long View]; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833, 840 n.6 (2005).
77. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 3, at 563; Thompson, Anti-Primacy, supra
note 3.
78. See Michael B. Dorff, Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay
Experiment Failed and How to Fix It 6 (2014) (explaining that the “heavy use of performance pay” for CEOs began in the 1980s); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay
Without Performance: The Unfulﬁlled Promise of Executive Compensation 1–2 (2004) (discussing the “official view” that boards design CEO compensation to “provide executives with
incentives to increase shareholder value” and noting that “the value of stock options
granted to CEOs” in the 1990s “jump[ed] ninefold”); Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in
Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 21, 23 (2003) (ﬁnding that median
equity-based compensation of executives at S&P 500 companies rose from 0% in 1984 to
66% in 2001).
79. See Cheffins, Public Company Transformed, supra note 27, at 369–705.
80. See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, Loosey-Goosey
Governance: Four Misunderstood Terms in Corporate Governance 1–2 (2019),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-79loosey-goosey-governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7D4-SSWV].
81. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Geo. L.J.
1375, 1381 (2007) (describing hedge fund activism); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock,
Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 987, 995–1005 (2010) (discussing changes in shareholder
composition and activism).
82. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 813–14 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1291–93
(1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 865–
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In sum, the result of this evolution is that shareholder wealth maximization became ingrained in the very notion of “mainstream” corporate
governance. Critical perspectives received labels such as “progressive corporate law” and “stakeholderism.”83 By 2001, in a provocatively titled article, The End of History for Corporate Law, Professors Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman proclaimed that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase
long-term shareholder value.”84
II. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MACHINE
As the previous discussion illuminates, the term corporate governance was initially intended as a tool to constrain corporate power for the
beneﬁt of the public, but it subsequently developed to embody a particular
view of the internal workings of the corporation, with shareholders
paramount and directors and managers serving as their agents.
In this Part, we describe how this intellectual legacy underpins the
contemporary U.S. corporate governance system. More speciﬁcally, we
describe the corporate governance machine and its three reinforcing components: law, institutions, and culture.85 We show that each element orients corporations in one direction—toward advancing shareholder
interests. For each component, we discuss the key players and institutions
that are traditionally considered participants in corporate law and governance.86 Although an even broader approach could be taken and discussion
69 (2013); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1907, 1922 (2013) [hereinafter Rock, Shareholder-Centric Reality].
83. For a sampling of this literature and discussion of critical perspectives on corporate
law, see Progressive Corporate Law (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Kent Greenﬁeld, The
Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities 126–27 (2010);
Matthew T. Bodie, The Next Iteration of Progressive Corporate Law, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
739, 739–40 (2017); Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation?
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 641, 666
(2011) [hereinafter Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation]; David Millon,
New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in
Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1373, 1377 (1993).
84. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 439–41.
85. For discussion of the deﬁnition and signiﬁcance of a “system,” see Draper L.
Kauffman, Jr., Systems One: An Introduction to Systems Thinking 1, 3 (1980) (“[A] system
is a collection of parts which interact with each other to function as a whole.”); Tamara
Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate
Law, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 599 (2018) (“A system has been deﬁned as any set of distinct
but interconnected elements or parts that operate as a uniﬁed whole to serve a function or
purpose.”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 479, 482–
83 (1997) (“To ‘analyze’ a system is to break it down into its constituent parts, to determine
the nature and identity of its subsystems, and to explain the relationships among them.”).
86. See Ann M. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External: A Taxonomy of Mechanisms
for Regulating Corporate Conduct, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 659 [hereinafter Lipton, Beyond
Internal and External] (discussing how “corporate and securities law are viewed as ‘internal’
to the corporation and as such, dictate the architecture of the corporate form and its decisionmaking processes,” whereas “other areas . . . such as antitrust, labor and employment
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of each component could ﬁll a volume, we take a bird’s-eye view to better
understand the system in which U.S. public corporations operate.
A.

Law

In many accounts, law is the central focus for understanding corporate governance. We begin our exploration of the corporate governance
machine with this component, setting out the main actors that create corporate law and regulate the business affairs of corporations: Delaware,
Congress, and two federal agencies: the SEC and the DOL. Together, these
actors reﬂect all branches of government, interacting and constraining
each other through principles of federalism. In particular, these actors
interact in a dynamic way: State corporate law generally speciﬁes internal
corporate affairs, while federal law provides a securities law overlay and
occasionally intervenes after periods of crisis. Importantly, federal law also
facilitated the aggregation of governance power in the hands of
institutional shareholders over the past several decades and inﬂuences
how that power is exercised. And as the following sections describe in
detail, this multifaceted legal regime has maintained a shareholderoriented equilibrium for the past several decades.
1. Delaware. — For more than a century, Delaware has held the top
honor of being home to the greatest number of public corporations and
producing the most inﬂuential corporate law.87 In turn, the question of
corporate purpose—the issue at the core of corporate governance, which
shapes ﬁduciary decisionmaking and affects the legal landscape in myriad
ways—is typically framed as whether Delaware legally requires ﬁduciaries
to maximize shareholder wealth.
Since the Deal Decade of the 1980s, statements in Delaware case law
and by prominent judges have suggested that directors must “make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken into
consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.”88 But a
law, intellectual property law, . . . and the like, are conceptualized as ‘external’ regulation”);
Elizabeth Pollman, The Supreme Court and the Pro-Business Paradox, 135 Harv. L. Rev.
220, 247–61 (2021) (describing the relationship between the internal and external
governance of corporations and the impact of Supreme Court jurisprudence on
corporations).
87. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491, 2493–94 (2005).
88. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 761, 768 (2015); see also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hile concern for
various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle
is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally related beneﬁt accruing to the
stockholders.”); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he
standard of conduct requires that directors seek ‘to promote the value of the corporation
for the beneﬁt of its stockholders.’” (quoting eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16
A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010))); eBay, 16 A.3d at 33 (“Promoting, protecting, or pursuing
nonstockholder considerations must lead at some point to value for stockholders.”).
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vocal group of legal scholars have persistently pushed back on this interpretation in favor of a broader view of corporate purpose and ﬁduciary
discretion. Some, for example, have argued that the deferential standard
of judicial review known as the business judgment rule means that, practically speaking, directors are not legally constrained in their decisionmaking to maximize shareholder value in most circumstances.89 In recent
years, however, the Delaware Court of Chancery has dealt several blows to
these interpretations. For example, in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, the court rejected the argument that the founders of Craigslist
could prioritize their community over their shareholders, stating the court
“cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate policy that speciﬁcally, clearly, and
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-proﬁt
Delaware corporation for the beneﬁt of its stockholders.”90 And, although
the Delaware Supreme Court has not revisited this issue since its takeover
jurisprudence of the 1980s,91 a handful of other Chancery Court opinions
contain similar statements.92
In addition to this—albeit relatively scant—language from Delaware
courts emphasizing the interests of shareholders as the ultimate corporate
ends, the Delaware General Corporation Law gives shareholders
important control rights.93 For example, shareholders are the only corporate constituency with the statutory power to elect board members and to
89. See, e.g., Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First
Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public 30–31 (2012) [hereinafter Stout,
Shareholder Value Myth]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 308–09 (1999); Einer Elhauge, Sacriﬁcing Corporate
Proﬁts in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 763–69 (2005).
90. 16 A.3d at 34.
91. See Cynthia Williams, The Future of Shareholder Wealth Maximization: A
Response to George Mocsary, Law & Liberty (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.lawliberty.org/
liberty-forum/the-future-of-shareholder-wealth-maximization-a-response-to-george-mocsary/
[https://perma.cc/7XTF-BHW2] (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court has not
explicitly required shareholder wealth maximization); see also Robert J. Rhee, A Legal
Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1951, 1957 (2018) (noting that the case
law on a duty to maximize shareholder value is “scant”).
92. See, e.g., N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92,
101 (Del. 2007) (stating that in a solvent corporation, “[t]he directors of Delaware corporations have ‘the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the beneﬁt
of its shareholder[] owners’” (quoting Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1988)));
Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172 (Del. Ch. 2014) (stating that
the standard of conduct for directors is “maximiz[ing] the value of the corporation for the
beneﬁt of its residual claimants” and “[i]n a solvent corporation, the residual claimants are
the stockholders”); Trados, 73 A.3d at 37 (“[T]he duty of loyalty therefore mandates that
directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the beneﬁt of the
providers of equity capital . . . .”); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129
(Del. Ch. 2011) (“Directors of a corporation still owe ﬁduciary duties to all
stockholders . . . .”).
93. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Is Corporate Purpose I: Evidence From My
Hometown, 33 Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 176, 179 (2017) (asserting that “stockholders are
the only corporate constituency with power under our prevailing system of corporate governance”) [hereinafter Strine, Corporate Power]; cf. Thompson, Anti-Primacy, supra note
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bring derivative suits to hold them accountable.94 Delaware has also
amended its corporate code to provide the option of organizing as a “public beneﬁt corporation,” further suggesting that pursuing stakeholder
interests is not the default rule for corporations.95 For these reasons, many
have observed that Delaware’s default simply allows for an “enlightened”
approach to shareholder primacy by leaving ﬁduciaries discretion to
determine the value-maximizing course of action for shareholders over
the long term.96 On the whole, from a relatively small number of cases and
statutory provisions, the idea that shareholder primacy is the law of the
land in Delaware has become “widely accepted” in business, legal, and
academic communities.97
Stepping back, however, we can appreciate that the power structure
under Delaware corporate law that awards rights to shareholders and
imposes on directors a ﬁduciary duty to act in the shareholders’ interests
is an important component of the corporate governance machine, but it
is not dispositive. Indeed, that power structure has been in place for decades and was present during the era of managerialism that preceded it.98
This reality suggests that other features of the corporate governance
machine are responsible for its shareholderist orientation and that
changes in Delaware corporate law might not be the key that many view
them to be. The next sections discuss how federal law further reinforces a
shareholder primacy view and, in many ways, a more exacting standard
than that of Delaware.

3, at 403–10 (discussing how corporate law creates shared power between managers, directors, and shareholders). For discussions of the efficiency of the corporate structure giving
shareholders voting power and addressing the needs of other constituencies by contract, see
Hansmann, Ownership of Enterprise, supra note 73; Oliver E. Williamson & Janet Bercovitz,
The Modern Corporation as an Efficiency Instrument: The Comparative Contracting
Perspective, in The American Corporation Today 327, 333–40 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996).
94. Strine, Corporate Power, supra note 94, at 178–79 (referencing Del. Code tit. 8,
§§ 251, 271, 327 (2016)). Creditors join shareholders in the power to bring derivative suits
to enforce ﬁduciary duties only when the corporation is insolvent. Quadrant Structured
Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 115 A.3d 535, 546 (Del. Ch. 2015).
95. See Del. Code tit. 8, § 362 (2021).
96. See, e.g., Harper Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value, supra note 13, at 74–75
(explaining that shareholder wealth maximization is generally regarded as a “norm of corporate behavior” and Delaware law provides “broad discretion” to directors that allows for
decisions that beneﬁt nonshareholders).
97. Rhee, supra note 92, at 1951, 1953–54 (“The data show that courts have pervasively
embraced the concept that corporate managers should maximize shareholder wealth.”);
see also Joan Macleod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 939, 944 (2017)
(describing “shareholder wealth maximization under various state laws (in and outside
Delaware) as a function of ﬁrm-level corporate governance”).
98. See Wells, A Long View, supra note 77, at 1076 (observing that shareholders had
“the basic legal rights . . . to vote, sell, and sue” during the mid-twentieth century period of
managerialism).
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2. Congress. — From time to time, the federal government has taken
on issues of corporate governance with national importance.99 What shape
do these incursions take? In the twenty-ﬁrst century, since shareholder
primacy has permeated the cultural and political discourse, federal
intervention tends to protect shareholders, increasing their power and
focusing management attention on their interests.100 Consider, for example, corporate governance reforms enacted under the Dodd–Frank Act in
the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis: requiring a “say-on-pay” shareholder vote
on executive compensation at public companies, providing for executive
compensation clawbacks under certain circumstances, and allowing proxy
access for shareholders to challenge incumbent management.101 Likewise,
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 imposed shareholder-friendly corporate
governance requirements, including stronger independence requirements for certain board committees.102 That Act also required top executives to certify ﬁnancial statements, with steep penalties for false
certiﬁcations.103 Each of these reforms incrementally tilted the balance of
power in favor of shareholders.104
There are a handful of recent counterexamples, which demonstrate
that the trend toward shareholder protection is not absolute and yet ultimately reinforce our general point. Perhaps the most well-known is the

99. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law,
Regulation, Spring 2003, at 26 (“[T]here has been a creeping—but steady—federalization
of corporate governance law.”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 Harv. L. Rev.
588, 590 (2003) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s Competition] (“Delaware’s chief competitive
pressure comes not from other states but from the federal government.”).
100. See Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What
Is the “Progressive” Agenda?, BYU L. Rev. 267, 286 (2018) (observing that “[s]ince the turn
of the millennium, shareholder-centric corporate governance reforms at the federal level
have picked up pace”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate
Law: Lessons From History, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1793, 1799–816 (2006) (ﬁnding that federal
intervention in corporate law has imposed tighter constraints on insiders to increase investor protection); cf. Lipton, Beyond Internal and External, supra note 87, at 659 (observing
that when Congress legislates for stakeholders, it is typically viewed as “external” to
corporate governance).
101. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1779, 1783 (2011) (outlining key corporate governance
provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act).
102. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 251, 255–56
(2005).
103. Id. at 264.
104. That was so despite the fact that many viewed shareholder primacy as contributing
to the crises that brought about the regulation. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and
the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275, 1283–84 (2002) (suggesting that
the “pursu[it] of maximum shareholder value” contributed to the Enron scandal); see also
Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 77, 82 (2003) (“Public attention may be
focused more on punishing the guilty than on preventing future harms.”).
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Dodd–Frank provision directing the SEC to issue a rule requiring companies to disclose their use of “conﬂict minerals.”105 The rule was not
adopted to further shareholder interests; it was enacted out of humanitarian concern about social harms arising from warfare in central Africa.106
And it was immediately challenged in federal court by industry associations—the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the Business Roundtable.107 After years of litigation, the
D.C. Circuit concluded that the rule’s disclosure requirements violated the
First Amendment.108 Then, in 2017, acting SEC Commissioner Michael
Piwowar called the rule “misguided” and implied that the SEC would not
enforce the rule’s remaining requirements, which concerned due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conﬂict minerals.109 That
same year, signs emerged that even members of Congress viewed the conﬂict minerals rule as a mistake—the House of Representatives twice passed
bills that would eradicate the rule by repealing or eliminating funding for
it.110 This uncertainty has led many corporations to ignore the rule’s
requirements, as if never enacted into law.111 Ultimately, this pushback
against Dodd–Frank’s conﬂict minerals rule reinforces our observation
that Congress usually intervenes in corporate governance to serve

105. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict
Minerals (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-163htm
[https://perma.cc/A9V2-TRLA].
106. See Fact Sheet: Disclosing the Use of Conﬂict Minerals, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/
opa/Article/2012-2012-163htm---related-materials.html [https://perma.cc/5NEF-7HF2]
(last updated Mar. 14, 2017) (citing concern “that the exploitation and trade of conﬂict
minerals by armed groups . . . help[s] to ﬁnance conﬂict in the DRC region”).
107. Carter Wood, Conﬂict Minerals Rule: Extraordinary Costs, Doubtful Beneﬁts, Bus.
Roundtable (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.businessroundtable.org/archive/media/blog/
conflict-minerals-rule-extraordinary-costs-doubtful-benefits [https://perma.cc/ZFZ4-AS5P].
108. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(“By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with the
exercise of that freedom of speech under the First Amendment.”).
109. See Michael S. Piwowar, Reconsideration of Conflict Minerals Rule Implementation,
SEC (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/reconsideration-of-conflictminerals-rule-implementation.html [https://perma.cc/5SFV-PS86]; Michael S. Piwowar,
Statement of Acting Chairman Piwowar on the Court of Appeals Decision on the Conﬂict
Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/piwowarstatement-court-decision-conflict-minerals-rule [https://perma.cc/W5WK-TC88]; SEC Div. of
Corp. Fin., Updated Statement on the Effect of the Court of Appeals Decision on the
Conﬂict Minerals Rule, SEC (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/
corpfin-updated-statement-court-decision-conflict-minerals-rule/ [https://perma.cc/LUL7MW7A].
110. Packaging Law at Keller & Heckman LLP, Conﬂict Minerals Rule Faces Uncertain
Future, Nat’l L. Rev. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/conﬂictminerals-rule-faces-uncertain-future [https://perma.cc/HSL7-6TBH] (referencing H.R.
3354, 115th Cong. (2017) and H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017)).
111. Kelly Franklin, US Investors Chide Companies for Thin Conﬂict Minerals Reports,
Chem. Watch (June 14, 2018), https://chemicalwatch.com/67693/us-investors-chidecompanies-for-thin-conﬂict-minerals-reports (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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shareholder interests and, to the extent it is perceived as veering from that
path, the corporate governance machine stands ready to push back.
3. Securities and Exchange Commission. — Congress often delegates
rulemaking and enforcement to agencies, and in this section, we focus on
the most inﬂuential regulator of corporate behavior: the SEC, which was
created after the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that
ensued.112 The agency articulates its mission as threefold: to protect
investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.113 The fact that the most inﬂuential regulator of ﬁnancial
markets and corporate behavior is charged with protecting investors suggests that advancing shareholder interests is a strong, if not dominant,
focus for federal securities law.114 Two aspects of the law illustrate this
point: periodic corporate reporting requirements and SEC regulation of
corporate affairs.
First, publicly traded companies are subject to periodic reporting
requirements aimed at informing investors of information that is material
to their trading.115 Indeed, all corporate disclosure is subject to securities
law, which frames its focus on generating information that is necessary or
beneﬁcial for investors, rather than for stakeholders or the general public.116 Federal securities laws embed this directive in the deﬁnition of
“materiality,” which courts have deﬁned as whether there is a “substantial
likelihood” that a “reasonable investor” would view the information as signiﬁcant.117 If information about a company’s harmful practices is not
material to investors, for example, the company might not disclose such

112. Loss et al., supra note 20, at 301–04; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codiﬁed as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2018)).
113. SEC, What We Do, supra note 21.
114. Recent scholarship has argued that “securities laws force public companies to conform to the shareholder primacy view of corporate purpose” because the “fear of activist
intervention” incentivizes companies “to maximize stock prices at the expense of all else.”
Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79 Md. L. Rev. 652, 655–56 (2020).
115. See SEC, What We Do, supra note 21. The accounting standards that the
SEC has adopted further enshrine a shareholder primacy view. See William W.
Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 5, 37 (2007) (discussing how the Financial
Accounting Standards Board aligned itself with “the broader economic shift away from managerialism and toward capital market governance under the norm of shareholder value”).
116. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 Geo. L.J. 337, 375–79 (2013) (noting that “the
conventional story for mandatory disclosure” focuses on “individual ﬁrms and . . . investors,” although disclosure is also justiﬁed on the basis of “beneﬁts to all citizens”); Ann M.
Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure,
37 Yale J. on Regul. 499, 502 (2020) [hereinafter Lipton, Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure] (“[S]ecurities disclosures are not targeted toward the community at large; they
are intended for investors alone, and when investors do not require disclosure, the general
public is kept in the dark.”).
117. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
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information, no matter the value of the information to the public.118 In
addition to regulating disclosure, the agency wields enforcement power
against those who make fraudulent statements and omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.119 Quite obviously, these rules
are intended to protect investors from fraud, and the ex ante effect is that
issuers are highly focused on revealing information material to investors in
a truthful manner.
Second, certain internal corporate affairs are subject to extensive regulation from the SEC, and the agency has repeatedly used its authority to
protect shareholders as a group. Consider shareholder proposals. For
years, the SEC has served as a gatekeeper by determining whether particular shareholder proposals must be included in public companies’ annual
proxy statements.120 The SEC is the arbiter of exclusionary grounds, such
as whether a proposal is “substantially related” to the company’s business
or an “ordinary business” matter, and it has signiﬁcant power to ﬁlter
which proposals involving social and governance issues make it onto a corporation’s proxy.121 And the SEC regulates not just the content of shareholder proposals, but also how investors vote on them. For example, the
118. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9106, 34-61469, FR-82, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6294–96 (Feb. 8,
2010); see also Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 Geo. L.J. 923,
935 (2019) (noting that the “benchmark is whether the information is material to investors”
and “[t]he SEC’s usual position is that . . . [materiality] should be understood in terms of
the information’s economic or ﬁnancial impact” and, with limited exception, “has not
required issuers to disclose speciﬁc categories of sustainability information”); Virginia
Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting Reform
From the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 Vill. L. Rev. 67, 74 (2020) (ﬁnding that
investors are concerned about “under-disclosure of material information” under the existing
interpretation of SEC disclosure rules).
119. SEC, What We Do, supra note 21.
120. Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); see also Donna M. Nagy,
Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems
and a Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 923–25, 938–40 (1998) (describing the
SEC’s practice of issuing no-action letters); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal
Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879, 879–85 (1994)
(explaining the SEC’s promulgation of the 14a-8 shareholder proposal rule and its
gatekeeping role).
121. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance:
Bureaucratic Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder Ratiﬁcation of Auditors, 2 Harv. Bus. L.
Rev. 501, 502–03 (2012) (describing how “the SEC has increasingly been called upon to
develop substantive standards and to arbitrate the often irreconcilable positions of interests
groups vying to inﬂuence the governance process” and how “the SEC has as its regulatory
mission the protection of shareholders and investors”); Lipton, Mandatory Stakeholder
Disclosure, supra note 117, at 554 (describing how proposals explicitly framed as requests
for management to pursue objectives other than shareholder wealth maximization would
be “on shaky legal ground”); Palmiter, supra note 121, at 879, 885 (observing that the SEC
promulgated the shareholder proposal rule to catalyze a “corporate democracy” but
“[s]tanding in the way of the rule’s purposes is the SEC’s attempt to channel the
shareholder-management dialogue through a regime of administrative licensing of
corporate speech”).
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SEC has adopted rules that regulate voting by institutional intermediaries
by making clear that these “investment advisers” have a ﬁduciary duty to
exercise votes to further their investors’ interests.122 This requirement has
been interpreted by scholars and institutional investors alike as requiring
a proﬁt motive for voting decisions and limiting action by investment
advisers to strategies aimed at obtaining risk-adjusted returns for
beneﬁciaries, not beneﬁts for stakeholders or the general public.123
An even more dramatic example of SEC action taken to beneﬁt shareholders, and speciﬁcally to expand shareholder voice, is proxy access. In
2010, the SEC passed—in “a close vote along partisan lines”—a rule that
would grant shareholders the ability to add director nominees to the company’s proxy.124 But the rule was swiftly challenged in court by the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, who argued that the rule
would distract directors and management from the performance of their
responsibilities and result in a loss in shareholder value.125 Ultimately, the
D.C. Circuit overturned the rule,126 leaving the choice to shareholders who
could submit proposals to urge companies to adopt proxy access bylaws.127
As the proxy access episode reveals, the SEC’s path toward fulﬁlling
its mission is not without controversy, and the agency has become increasingly politicized.128 But as section II.C.3 discusses, shareholder primacy has
become enmeshed across both sides of the political aisle, indicating that
increased polarization is unlikely to meaningfully change the agency’s
shareholderist orientation. Indeed, even pro-management action that is
typically supported by Republican appointees tends to be described as beneﬁtting shareholders. For example, the SEC has proposed rules that would
substantially raise the ownership thresholds and outcome hurdles for
122. Rules and Regulations, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6.
123. See, e.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, How the SEC Can Help Mitigate the “Proactive”
Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism, 8 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2019) (discussing the SEC
proxy voting rule and stating that “the objective of this ﬁduciary duty is shareholder wealth
maximization”); infra section II.B.1.
124. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insigniﬁcance of Proxy Access, 97 Va. L. Rev.
1347, 1351 (2011).
125. Reply Brief of Petitioners Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America at 8–9, Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014801.
126. Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
127. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., 462 F.3d 121, 123
(2d Cir. 2006) (holding that Rule 14-8 did not exclude proxy access bylaw shareholder proposals). After that decision was issued, the SEC amended Rule 14-8 to overrule it, but in
2010, the agency reversed course, adopting a new Rule 14a-8 that would permit shareholders
to bring proxy access bylaw proposals under certain circumstances. See Reacting to
Shareholder Proxy Access Proposals, Reed Smith (Oct. 10, 2011), https://
www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2011/10/reacting-to-shareholder-proxy-accessproposals [https://perma.cc/8JSG-AE7H].
128. See, e.g., Joseph Engelberg, Matthew Henriksson, Asaf Manela & Jared Williams,
The Partisanship of Financial Regulators 4 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481564
[https://perma.cc/3CFG-9C45] (unpublished manuscript).
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shareholder proposal submissions and resubmissions.129 Critics observed
that the new rules impede small retail shareholders from submitting proposals and may insulate management from accountability.130 The SEC
nonetheless couched the legal reform as advancing shareholder interests—reﬂecting that even when the agency gives management a victory, it
often does so in the language of a shareholderist regulatory agenda.131
4. Department of Labor. — Just as the SEC regulates investor conduct,
so does the DOL, the federal agency with regulatory oversight over retirement accounts in the United States.132 Speciﬁcally, the DOL sets standards
of conduct for public and private pension funds subject to the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).133 These funds
manage trillions of dollars on behalf of U.S. employees and invest much
of it in the stock market.134 Importantly, ERISA imposes a ﬁduciary duty
on investment advisers that invest pension fund assets, and the agency has
interpreted this requirement as imposing a duty to maximize the plan’s
ﬁnancial value.135
As clear proof of this orientation, the agency once ﬁnalized a rule that
prohibited plan ﬁduciaries from selecting plan assets based on
nonﬁnancial objectives.136 The rule speciﬁcally targeted ESG investment
vehicles: The news release announcing the proposed rule stated that
“[t]he proposal is designed, in part, to make clear that ERISA plan
129. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rule Amendments to Improve Accuracy and
Transparency of Proxy Voting Advice (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2019-231 [https://perma.cc/YL6Q-HY74].
130. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadﬂies, 94 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 569, 619–23 (2021) (discussing how changes to shareholder proposal rules may
impact the role played by “gadﬂies or other individuals” as “governance facilitators”);
Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Proposals to Restrict Shareholder Voting
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-2019-11-05open-meeting [https://perma.cc/PZV6-LQYX] (noting that the proposal “adopt[s] promanagement changes that swat a gadﬂy with a sledgehammer” and may “insulate corporate
managers from accountability”).
131. See, e.g., Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Under Exchange Act Rule
14a-8, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,458, 66,503 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (justifying elevated resubmission
hurdles as beneﬁtting shareholders by, among other things, allowing them “to focus on the
processing of proposals that may garner higher levels of voting support”).
132. See Summary of the Major Laws of the Department of Labor, DOL,
https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/majorlaws [https://perma.cc/RK9Y-KWXK] (last
visited Aug. 9, 2021).
133. See id.
134. Heather Gillers, Public Pension Plans Continue to Shift Into U.S. Stocks, Wall St.
J. (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-pension-plans-continue-to-shift-intou-s-stocks-11572955200 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); F. Norrestad, Total Assets of
Pension Funds in the United States From 2009 to 2019, Statista (Dec. 7, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/421729/pension-fundsassets-usa
[https://perma.cc/N8WA-M33Z].
135. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2020); see also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG
Investing by a Trustee, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 381, 407 (2020).
136. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2550.
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ﬁduciaries may not invest in ESG vehicles when they understand an
underlying investment strategy of the vehicle is to subordinate return or
increase risk for the purpose of nonﬁnancial objectives.”137 In other words,
the agency adopted a particularly stringent form of shareholder primacy,
requiring plan ﬁduciaries to have an “unwavering focus” on pecuniary
goals and removing discretion to consider noneconomic shareholder
value more broadly.138 Since then, the DOL under a new administration
has proposed to amend the rule to allow more leeway for ﬁduciaries to
consider ESG factors, but even these revised rules emphasize the ﬁnancial
interests of investors as the lodestar.139 Ultimately, this example is
particularly revealing because it again shows how government policy not
only facilitates the aggregation of governance power in the hands of
inﬂuential investors but also inﬂuences how that money is invested and
how governance rights are exercised.140
In sum, this section explores the main actors that create corporate law
and regulate the business affairs of corporations: Delaware, Congress, the
SEC, and the DOL. Each of these actors interacts in a dynamic way,
inﬂuencing aspects of corporate behavior in tandem (and some would say,
in competition with each other141), generally toward the beneﬁt of
shareholders. And as the next section reveals, the legal components of the
machine also shape its institutional components, bolstering their
shareholderist orientation.
B.

Institutions

Corporate governance is not only a creature of law but also of markets
and institutions. In this section, we focus on the institutional players that
participate in the market for corporate governance—i.e., that are responsible for shaping the body of extralegal rules and norms that powerfully
shape corporate behavior. These institutions are inﬂuenced by the legal
137. Press Release, DOL, U.S. Department of Labor Proposes New Investment Duties
Rule (June 23, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200623
[https://perma.cc/DD7D-WFJ8] [hereinafter DOL, New Investment Duties Rule].
138. Id.; see also Lipton, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 13, at 889–90 (discussing how
the Bush and Trump Administrations promulgated guidance advising that ERISA trustees
should avoid consideration of ESG factors whereas the Obama Administration granted more
discretion).
139. Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57,272 (proposed Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codiﬁed at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550)
(“The Department is concerned that . . . current regulation may deter ﬁduciaries from
taking steps that other marketplace investors would take in enhancing investment value and
performance, or improving investment portfolio resilience against the potential ﬁnancial
risks and impacts often associated with climate change and other ESG factors.”).
140. See Lipton, Beyond Internal and External, supra note 87, at 688 (“[T]he existence
of different types of investors, their preferences with respect to corporate behavior, their
risk tolerance, and their time horizons, are all at least partially a product of regulatory
choice.”).
141. See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 100, at 592.
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regime described above, and they in turn provide far-reaching inﬂuence
over corporate affairs. In this section, we describe the many institutional
players in the corporate governance industry and their role in focusing
company attention on shareholder interests.
1. Inﬂuential Investors. — Today’s institutional investors are more
powerful than ever before. As a result of capital market concentration, the
largest shareholders in most public companies are investment intermediaries with the heft and sophistication to wield their governance power to
advance shareholder interests.142 Although these intermediaries vary in
their level of engagement and investment strategy, all put further pressure
on management to focus on shareholder value. Before describing this
dynamic in more detail, we observe that the rise of powerful investors has
been a key driver of the corporate governance machine’s shareholderist
orientation and has spurred the development of ancillary institutions that
further promote shareholder interests.
Historically, only a subset of institutional shareholders—hedge funds
and pension funds—played a signiﬁcant role in shareholder activism.143
Hedge fund activists generally use their governance rights to induce the
targeted company to maximize shareholder wealth and marshal support
from other shareholders to this cause.144 Of course, this role is not without
controversy, as some critics view their activism as harming long-term shareholder value—but note, again, that even this dominant form of criticism
takes shareholder value as the lodestar.145 Pension funds, and public pension funds in particular, are also active shareholders,146 although their
incentives and objectives are less clear cut—on the one hand, federal guidance suggests their ﬁduciary duty requires pursuing economic value for

142. See, e.g., John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem
of Twelve 2 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3247337 [https://perma.cc/AD6U-B6CB] (discussing how “control of most public
companies – that is the wealthiest organizations in the world, with more revenue than most
states – will soon be concentrated in the hands of a dozen or fewer [institutions]”).
143. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 570
(1990); Rock, Shareholder-Centric Reality, supra note 83, at 1922.
144. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1029, 1064 (2007).
145. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of
Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545, 585–586 (2016).
146. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018, 1019–20 (1998)
(“[L]abor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize
return on capital.”).
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plan participants;147 on the other, those participants are generally
employees whose interests may conﬂict with shareholders more broadly.148
Over the past decade, hedge funds and pension funds have remained
active, but the most notable trend has been the rising inﬂuence of mutual
funds. Today, the mutual fund giants—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State
Street, or the so called “Big Three”—together hold over 20% of the equity
of S&P 500 companies.149 And these powerful shareholders have begun to
articulate a broader view of ﬁduciary responsibility and corporate purpose.
For example, in a 2018 public letter to company CEOs, BlackRock CEO
Larry Fink explained: “To prosper over time, every company must not only
deliver ﬁnancial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society. Companies must beneﬁt all of their stakeholders,
including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in
which they operate.”150 This statement was celebrated as an embrace by
one of the world’s largest investors of a stakeholder model and an
abandonment of shareholder primacy.151
But a closer look reveals that Fink’s letter is squarely aligned with the
pursuit of shareholder value and economic return in particular. In a subsequent letter, Fink explained that “proﬁts and purpose are inextricably
linked. Proﬁts are essential if a company is to effectively serve all of its
stakeholders over time . . . . Similarly, when a company truly understands
and expresses its purpose, it functions with the focus and strategic
discipline that drive long-term proﬁtability.”152
The Big Three’s voting guidelines further illustrate the link between
their governance initiatives and shareholder value. For example,
Vanguard explains: “We believe that good governance practices—
thoughtful board composition, effective oversight of company strategy and
147. See, e.g., DOL, New Investment Duties Rule, supra note 138; see also David
Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon, at xii, 43–
44 (2018) (discussing “the massive growth of worker pension funds” and their shareholder
activism “to make corporate managers more accountable to long-term shareholders”).
148. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 796 (1993) (arguing that public pension fund managers face “considerable political pressure to temper investment policies with local considerations, such as fostering in-state employment, which are not aimed at maximizing the
value of their portfolios’ assets”) [hereinafter Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism].
149. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev.
721, 724, 734 ﬁg.1 (2019) (“The average combined stake in S&P 500 companies held by the
Big Three essentially quadrupled over the past two decades, from 5.2% in 1998 to 20.5% in
2017 . . . .”).
150. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, Inc., to Chief
Exec. Officers 1 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018larry-ﬁnk-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/W2E3-ML9F].
151. See, e.g., David J. Berger, Reconsidering Stockholder Primacy in an Era of
Corporate Purpose, 74 Bus. Law. 659, 662–63 (2019).
152. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, Inc., to Chief
Exec. Officers 1 (2019), https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/en/2019-larryﬁnk-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/2DER-UJQR].
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risks, aligned pay for performance, and strong provisions to empower
shareholders—are the foundation on which a company’s board of directors can build enduring shareholder value.”153 Likewise, BlackRock
explains: “Our engagement priorities promote sound corporate governance and business practices that are consistent with sustainable long-term
ﬁnancial returns.”154 And ﬁnally, State Street explains that it prioritizes
ESG issues that will have “the most material impacts on the long-term value
of our portfolio companies.”155 In sum, while some of these institutional
investors have begun to highlight the importance of stakeholder interests,
there is no sign that they have abandoned the pursuit of long-term shareholder value.156 Rather than indicate a sharp turn toward stakeholder capitalism, Fink’s statements may instead reﬂect an enlightened approach to
shareholderism that views consideration of stakeholder welfare as a means
of sustainably achieving value for shareholders.157
We should not be surprised that institutional investors reinforce a
shareholder primacy viewpoint, even while championing an enlightened
perspective. For one, like pension funds, mutual funds have a ﬁduciary
duty to act in the best interests of their clients, and as discussed, this duty
has been interpreted as requiring wealth maximization.158 Not only that,
institutional shareholders will pursue ﬁnancial performance so long as
that is the metric by which their customers evaluate them.
2. Investor Associations. — Inﬂuential investors exert pressure not only
on their own but also in coordination with other investors via associations.
The most well-known investor association is the Council of Institutional

153. Vanguard, Investment Stewardship: 2019 Annual Report 1 (2019), https://
about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/
2019_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/352K-TUBV].
154. Investment Stewardship, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/sa/professional/
en/about-us/investment-stewardship [https://perma.cc/LE67-QJ5G] (last visited Aug. 26,
2021).
155. Asset Stewardship, State St. Glob. Advisors, https://www.ssga.com/us/en/
individual/mf/capabilities/esg/asset-stewardship (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Aug. 26, 2021).
156. An incentive to maximize long-term portfolio value could also help explain
emphasis on sustainability and stakeholders. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. Legal Analysis 35, 39 (2014) (“[S]hare price
maximization can in the presence of systemic externalities lead to reduced portfolio returns
to investors.”); Condon, supra note 15, at 5 (explaining institutional investor support of
climate activism by framing value maximization at portfolio rather than ﬁrm level).
157. Another possibility is that this activity may represent a savvy marketing campaign
designed to convince investors that by choosing a BlackRock fund, they can have it all—
wealth maximization and a social impact. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David
H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the New Millennial Corporate
Governance, 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1243, 1249–51 (2021) (arguing that index funds are
competing for investments from millennials who place a premium on social values).
158. See Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics, Investor Advisers Act Release No. 2256, 69
Fed. Reg. 41,696, 41,696 (July 9, 2004); Hart & Zingales, supra note 17.
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Investors (CII).159 Founded in 1985, CII espouses the goal of advancing
“strong governance standards at public companies and strong shareholder
rights.”160 Today, its membership includes more than 140 asset managers,
including public pension funds, corporate and labor funds, foundations,
and endowments, with combined assets under management of $39 trillion.161 The association’s website boasts that “institutional shareowners
have a much greater voice today than they did in 1985 in part because of
the constant vigilance and hard work of CII to protect and strengthen that
voice.”162
How does CII strengthen shareholder voice? In coordination with its
members, the organization has developed an extensive body of policies
that embrace accountability to shareholders163 and shareholder participation in governance.164 The organization pursues all avenues to gain adherence to these goals—it “advocates vigorously for CII policies via speeches,
reports, letters and testimony.”165 For example, in response to the Business
Roundtable’s revised statement in favor of running companies “for the
beneﬁt of all stakeholders,” the CII responded publicly with a sharp rebuttal that companies must “sustain a focus on long-term shareholder value”

159. Although CII is the most prominent investor advocacy group, others exert inﬂuence. For example, the Investor Stewardship Group represents sixteen investor members
with $17 trillion in assets under management. About the Investor Stewardship Group and
the Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance, Inv. Stewardship Grp.,
https://isgframework.org [https://perma.cc/GX3N-95JR] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). That
group has outlined a “stewardship code” for U.S. companies with six main principles,
including “[b]oards are accountable to shareholders” and “[b]oards should be responsive
to shareholders.” Abe M. Friedman, Investor Coalition Publishes U.S. Stewardship Code,
Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Feb. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/02/09/investor-coalition-publishes-u-s-stewardship-code/
[https://perma.cc/RQ6VUM2W].
160. About CII, Council of Institutional Invs., https://www.cii.org/about
[https://perma.cc/Y38T-4WHW] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Policies on Corporate Governance, Council of Institutional Invs.,
https://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies [https://perma.cc/N47H-BGJY] (last visited Aug.
9, 2021) (“Corporate governance structures and practices should protect and enhance a
company’s accountability to its shareowners . . . .”).
164. Id. (“Shareowners should have meaningful ability to participate in and vote on the
major fundamental decisions that affect corporate viability, and meaningful opportunities
to suggest or nominate director candidates and to suggest processes and criteria for director
selection and evaluation.”); see also Tim C. Opler & Jonathan S. Sokobin, Does Coordinated
Institutional Activism Work?: An Analysis of the Activities of the Council of Institutional
Investors 4–5 (Dice Ctr. for Rsch. in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 95-5, 1996),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=46880 [https://perma.cc/QJP3-876S] (discussing how CII
provided a forum for public and private pension funds to coordinate shareholder activism).
165. Issues & Advocacy, Council of Institutional Invs., https://www.cii.org/
issues_advocacy [https://perma.cc/C7WA-UVRS] [hereinafter CII, Issues and Advocacy]
(last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
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and operate with “clear accountability to company owners.”166 In addition
to this kind of public advocacy, CII staff and members also engage directly
with “corporate managers and directors, stock exchange officials,
regulators and policymakers.”167
As the CII example reveals, investor advocacy groups help enshrine a
shareholder primacy viewpoint. To secure broad participation, the groups
adopt principles that they frame as shared in common with institutional
investors. And once investors have signed on, the groups have powerful
leverage to inﬂuence company behavior to further shareholder interests.
3. Industry Associations. — Institutional investors are not the only
entities that work in association to advance their interests; corporate executives do too.168 And some of these industry associations are active participants in the corporate governance machine, engaging in advocacy on
issues related to governance and often pushing pro-management positions
with the claimed objective of serving shareholder interests.
The Business Roundtable, an association of CEOs of large U.S. public
companies, is one of the most prominent industry associations. In 2019,
the Business Roundtable revised its standing statement that “corporations
exist principally to serve their shareholders.”169 Speciﬁcally, the organization issued a press release announcing the signatories’ commitment to
running companies “for the beneﬁt of all stakeholders—customers,
employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.”170 But instead of
providing a full embrace of stakeholderism, the statement framed its new
commitment to stakeholders as a means of “[g]enerating long-term value
for shareholders.”171 And even this incremental reframing generated a
hostile response from many, including investor associations (CII among
them) and academics who responded with a defense of shareholder
primacy.172

166. Press Release, Council of Institutional Invs., Council of Institutional Investors
Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_response [https://perma.cc/V9U3-QMPA] [hereinafter
CII Response].
167. CII, Issues and Advocacy, supra note 166.
168. Lee Drutman, The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became
Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate 98 (2015).
169. David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything,
Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. Times (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/
business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
170. Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redeﬁnes the Purpose of a
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/3B7C-ZGVJ].
171. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/brt.org/BRT-StatementonthePurposeofaCorporationJuly2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YHL-CKHX].
172. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 4, at 1–4; Jesse Fried, Shareholders
Always Come First and That’s a Good Thing, Fin. Times (Oct. 7, 2019),
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Other industry associations have taken positions with even stronger
claims about serving shareholder interests. For example, the National
Association of Manufacturers launched “The Main Street Investors’
Coalition,” and lobbied the SEC to make it harder for shareholders to submit proposals. The organization claimed its motivation was to advance the
interests of “main street investors” whose voices had been drowned out by
large institutional shareholders.173
Why would industry associations prioritize shareholder interests? The
answer, we believe, is that they generally don’t; instead, it appears that corporate managers pursue their own interests by touting shareholder welfare
as a way to attract broad support for reforms that increase management
power and insulation. As the Main Street Investors’ Coalition example
reveals, when management is faced with unwanted pressure from vocal
groups of shareholders, business associations may seek reform that minimizes their voice, in the guise of protecting shareholders at large. More
broadly, these examples reﬂect a pattern of industry associations working
within the corporate governance machine to achieve their aims, even
when those aims run directly counter to the machine’s pro-shareholder
orientation.
4. Proxy Advisors. — Proxy advisors are an important recent addition
to the corporate governance machine.174 These private companies collect
information, analyze corporate elections, and provide voting recommendations to clients for a fee.175 And as the stock market has consolidated in
the hands of institutional investors, the proxy advisors that advise them
have gained in power and inﬂuence.176 Institutional investors hold approximately 80% of public company shares, but their structure and ﬁnancial
model limits their ability to research and cast informed votes on all matters
without incurring signiﬁcant costs, thus opening the door for proxy advisors to help guide their voting decisions.177 Consider the mutual fund company Vanguard, which cast approximately 170,000 votes for over 13,000
https://www.ft.com/content/fff170a0-e5e0-11e9-b8e0-026e07cbe5b4 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review); CII Response, supra note 167.
173. Leading National Associations Announce Launch of First-of-Its-Kind Investor
Coalition, PR Newswire (May 22, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
leading-national-associations-announce-launch-of-ﬁrst-of-its-kind-investor-coalition300652366.html [https://perma.cc/X75V-H4JE].
174. See Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth
or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869, 870 (2010).
175. Id. at 870–71.
176. This reality is compounded by the fact that the DOL and SEC urge institutional
investors to vote all the proxies of their portfolio company investments. See Disclosure of
Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codiﬁed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270,
274); Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, DOL, to Helmuth Fandl,
Chairman of Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc., DOL Interpretive Letter on Avon Products, Inc.
Employees’ Retirement Plan, 1988 WL 897696, at *2 (Feb. 23, 1988).
177. See Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17, 46, 50–51
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portfolio companies in one recent year.178 To accomplish this task, the
institution often relies on two proxy advisors: Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis & Co.179 Other large institutional investors
generally do the same.180 As a result, the two dominant proxy advisor ﬁrms
wield ample power in corporate elections, shifting a signiﬁcant percentage
of shareholder votes.181
Because proxy advisors supply voting advice on thousands of different
companies each year, they are forced to be generalists on a wide range of
governance issues that commonly arise, ranging from proxy access to corporate political spending disclosures.182 To supply advice at scale, they
reach conclusions about “best practices” on each issue and then set governance guidelines that are enforced through their voting guidance.183 As
a result, proxy advisors inﬂuence not only investor voting but also board
(2019); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493,
516 (2018) [hereinafter Lund, Against Passive Shareholder Voting]; BlackRock, BlackRock
Investment Stewardship: Protecting Our Clients’ Assets for the Long-Term 13 (2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-proﬁle-of-blackrockinvestment-stewardship-team-work.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7BR-QFJB]
[hereinafter
BlackRock, Investment Stewardship] (“[I]n most markets we subscribe to two research
providers.”).
178. Vanguard, supra note 154, at 8.
179. See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds 2 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 560/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3124039 [https://perma.cc/8A4N-7W3R] (showing that recommendations from
the two leading proxy advisors heavily inﬂuence mutual fund voting).
180. Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes: The
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. Fin. 2905, 2928 (2016)
(ﬁnding that a majority of institutional investor respondents agreed that proxy advisors help
them make informed voting decisions); BlackRock, Investment Stewardship, supra note 178.
181. Choi et al., supra note 175, at 906 (estimating that an ISS recommendation shifts
6%–10% of the shareholder votes); McCahery et al., supra note 181, at 2928 (ﬁnding that
“proxy advisors do not just aggregate shareholder preferences or coincide with them, but
actually inﬂuence voting decisions”); Timothy M. Doyle, Am. Council for Cap. Formation,
The Realities of Robo-Voting 6 (2018), http://accfcorpgov.org/wp-content/uploads/
ACCF-RoboVoting-Report_11_8_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU5G-ZCGJ] (estimating
ISS inﬂuence as being “between 6–11% and up to 25%”); David F. Larcker, Brian Tayan &
James R. Copland, The Big Thumb on the Scale: An Overview of the Proxy Advisory
Industry, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (June 14, 2018), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/14/the-big-thumb-on-the-scale-an-overview-of-theproxy-advisory-industry/ [https://perma.cc/LVX6-47WJ] (discussing studies ﬁnding that
proxy advisors can inﬂuence up to 30% of shareholder voting).
182. See Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence From
a Regression-Discontinuity Design, 29 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3394, 3394–96 (2016) (noting that ISS
“covers almost 40,000 meetings in 115 countries and has over 1,600 institutional clients”
and has used a quantitative methodology for determining the level of analysis to give a
company’s say-on-pay proposal).
183. Id.; David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series,
And Then a Miracle Happens!: How Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting
Recommendations? 1 (2013), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/ﬁles/publicationpdf/cgri-closer-look-31-proxy-ﬁrms-voting-recommendations.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review).
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and management behavior before the corporate proxy even arrives: Many
companies proactively adopt governance policies that mesh with ISS and
Glass Lewis recommendations and sometimes even seek their behind-thescenes consulting advice on executive compensation packages and management-sponsored proposals to increase the likelihood that shareholders
will approve them.184
What do these inﬂuential advisors recommend? A perusal of ISS’s voting principles reveals that shareholder primacy is deeply ingrained in its
policies. For example, its principles state that ISS aims to promote “longterm shareholder value creation” and encourage practices that respect
shareholder rights.185 The guidelines further explain that “boards should
be accountable to shareholders, the owners of the companies,” “shareholders should have meaningful rights on structural provisions,” and
“boards should be sufficiently independent so as to ensure that they are
able and motivated to effectively supervise management[] . . . for the beneﬁt of all shareholders.”186 Likewise, Glass Lewis’s policies explain that the
purpose of its proxy research is to “facilitate shareholder voting in favor of
governance structures that will . . . create shareholder value.”187
It is unsurprising that proxy advisors would proclaim a commitment
to shareholder value because this is what their institutional investor clients
generally believe they are duty-bound to pursue.188 And even when proxy
advisors offer advice relevant to stakeholder interests, those guidelines do
not abandon a shareholder primacy viewpoint. Instead, proxy advisor ESG
guidelines generally seek to “align responsible investment policies and
practices with shareholder interests.”189 This orientation is generally consistent with the voting guidelines of many large institutional investors and
184. See, e.g., David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing
Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J.L. & Econ. 173, 175–79 (2015) [hereinafter Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting]. In addition, in 2020, the SEC approved
new rules that require proxy ﬁrms to provide their research to companies at the same time
as their investor clients and to share rebuttals to their advice from executives. Exemptions
From the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 89372, 85 Fed.
Reg. 55,082 (July 22, 2020).
185. ISS Global Voting Principles, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/policygateway/iss-global-voting-principles [https://perma.cc/73RN-KNRA] (last visited Aug. 9,
2021).
186. Id.
187. Glass Lewis, 2020 Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy
Advice for the United States 3 (2020), https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_US.pdf [https://perma.cc/65RY-QTVV].
188. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6565
(Feb. 7, 2003) (“Mutual funds are formed as corporations or business trusts under state law
and, as in the case of other corporations and trusts, must be operated for the beneﬁt of their
shareholders.”); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 136 (discussing the ﬁduciary duties of
trustees of pension funds in relation to the use of ESG factors).
189. ISS ESG, Responsible Investment Solutions, https://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/
products/sheet-iss-esg.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFB6-M94K] (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
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may help explain why many ESG-oriented funds often vote against environmental and social shareholder proposals, just like the shareholder
value–oriented funds in the institution.190 Ultimately, the principal goal of
proxy advisor advice is to render management more accountable to shareholder interests, which makes it difficult to pursue stakeholder welfare
whenever doing so conﬂicts with shareholder value maximization.
5. Stock Exchanges. — Stock exchanges represent another source of
corporate governance. For example, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) is the world’s largest stock exchange, and it creates many
corporate governance rules that apply to its 2,800 listed companies.191
These detailed rules inﬂuence the conduct of those companies, and they
have a distinct shareholder primacy ﬂavor. As the NYSE explained in its
corporate governance guide, “companies need corporate governance
policies that place the interests of their shareholders ﬁrst.”192 As such, the
stock exchange requires corporate boards to have a majority of
independent directors and key committees populated by only these
independent directors.193 In addition, the exchange mandates a say-on-pay
shareholder vote.194 Compliance with these standards is enforced by a
division of the exchange known as NYSE Regulation (NYSER); the
organization can enforce violations with penalties or delisting.195 The
NYSE’s closest competitor, the Nasdaq Stock Market, follows a similar
approach.196
What motivates the NYSE and Nasdaq to adopt these rules? The stock
exchanges are public companies themselves and tend to follow the
190. See Caleb N. Griffin, Environmental and Social Voting at Index Funds, 44 Del. J.
Corp. L. 167, 167 (2020) (demonstrating that “despite a considerable marketing focus on
their E&S efforts, overall support for E&S proposals is low at the Big Three”); Jackie Cook
& Jon Hale, 2019 ESG Proxy Voting Trends by 50 U.S. Fund Families, Harv. L. Sch. F. on
Corp. Governance (Mar. 23, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/23/2019esg-proxy-voting-trends-by-50-u-s-fund-families/#4
[https://perma.cc/Z4WQ-QZDB]
(describing how asset managers operationalize voting strategies and providing summary voting data on ESG shareholder proposals); Patrick Temple-West, Big US Sustainable Funds
Fail to Support ESG Shareholder Proposals, Fin. Times (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/5d342a5d-443d-3327-9502-2361f37f251c (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting that “funds labelled by BlackRock, JPMorgan Asset
Management and Vanguard as sustainable frequently sided with a company’s management
and against shareholder proposals on [ESG-related] issues”).
191. Kristin N. Johnson, Regulating Innovation: High Frequency Trading in Dark Pools,
42 J. Corp. L. 833, 839 (2017).
192. Tom Farley, Foreword, in NYSE: Corporate Governance Guide, at vi, vi (Steven A.
Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain & Sabastian V. Niles eds., 2014).
193. Glenn H. Booraem, An Institutional Investor’s Viewpoint on Corporate
Governance, in NYSE: Corporate Governance Guide, supra note 193, at 13, 14.
194. Id.
195. See NYSE Disciplinary Actions, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/regulation/
disciplinary-actions [https://perma.cc/NH3N-M9SQ] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021).
196. See
FAQs
Listings,
Nasdaq,
https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/
MaterialHome.aspx?mcd=LQ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Aug. 9,
2021) (describing the Nasdaq’s enforcement powers).
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demands of other institutions driving the market for listings.197 In addition, the exchanges must ﬁle their rules with the SEC for review,198 and on
occasion, Congress has mandated that the exchanges adopt certain listing
standards.199 This regulatory oversight likely contributes to the exchanges’
focus on “good governance” that privileges shareholders; if the NYSE or
Nasdaq drops listing standards below some perceived acceptable level,
they may be subject to additional scrutiny. As a result, absent a signiﬁcant
shift in this regulatory agenda and dynamic, we can expect the stock
exchanges will continue to regulate listed companies with an investorfocused mandate.200
6. Stock Indices. — Unlike stock exchanges, which have inﬂuenced
company governance for over a century, stock indices are a more recent
addition to the system. A stock index is a measurement of a section of the
stock market, often used as a benchmark for actively managed mutual
funds or as a baseline for passively managed mutual funds.201 In the United
States, thousands of indices exist, but three dominate the market: the S&P
500, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and the Nasdaq Composite.202
These three major indices are sufficiently important drivers of investor
demand for company shares that their standards for inclusion can
inﬂuence corporate behavior.203
197. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453, 1500 (1997)
(“Exchanges have strong incentives to provide rules of market structure that investors want
and to compel adherence by their members to contractual and ﬁduciary obligations.”); see
also Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 Va. L. Rev. 925, 963–64 (1999) (explaining that
“[e]xchanges serve corporations by providing liquidity for their securities” and have
incentives to protect investors).
198. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2020); Rules - All NYSE Group Exchanges, NYSE,
https://www.nyse.com/regulation/ [https://perma.cc/3L5G-LQEY] (last visited Aug. 26,
2021); see also Listing Center, Nasdaq, https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/
Nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq-5000 [https://perma.cc/8MT6-VPSW] (last visited Aug. 11, 2021)
(describing SEC oversight authority over Nasdaq listings).
199. See, e.g., Corporate Governance Issues, Including Executive Compensation
Disclosure and Related SRO Rules, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/doddfrank/corporategovernance.shtml [https://perma.cc/A4PH-H4D8] (last visited Aug. 9,
2021).
200. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687, 694–97 (1986).
201. Adriana Z. Robertson, The (Mis)Uses of the S&P 500, at 1 (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205235
[https://perma.cc/3YQJ-JQ7W]
[hereinafter
Robertson, (Mis)Uses] (unpublished manuscript).
202. There Are Now More Indexes Than Stocks, Bloomberg (May 12, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/there-are-now-more-indexes-thanstocks (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
203. Lysle Boller & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Testing the Theory of Common Stock
Ownership 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27515, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3649879 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding that
stocks entering the S&P 500 index experience a signiﬁcant increase in institutional
ownership and stock returns); Robertson, (Mis)Uses, supra note 202, at 2 (noting it has
been recognized since at least the mid-1980s that “stocks tend to jump after being added to
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Consider the S&P 500, the world’s most-tracked index by assets under
management that contains “500 of the top companies in leading industries
of the U.S. economy.”204 Contrary to popular understanding, the construction of the index is not passive or neutral; an index committee of the S&P
Dow Jones exercises signiﬁcant discretion over the methodology for determining eligibility and inclusion.205 Like the stock exchanges, the index
adopts governance standards aiming to “protect the integrity and quality
of [S&P’s] benchmarks, and comply with applicable regulatory standards
and accepted industry practices.”206
The business model of index creators like S&P Dow Jones tells us
something about their motivation in carrying out these stated goals: Their
proﬁts depend on licensing the use of their indices to asset managers for
portfolio construction or fund benchmarks.207 This logic would seem to
suggest that the S&P eligibility standards would seek to eliminate poorly
governed companies, as doing so should boost the performance of the
index over time and increase demand for it. A misalignment, however, also
exists: Regardless of actual company performance, the index provider may
have an incentive to cater to the wishes of its asset manager clients so as to
maximize proﬁts from licensing fees.208 This incentive further suggests that
the governance standards adopted by indices will reﬂect the preferences
of their clients.
Take the major indices’ pushback on dual-class equity companies as
an example of these incentives in action. In the wake of an increase in
dual-class technology company IPOs, several major index providers,
including S&P Dow Jones, declared that they would exclude dual-class
companies from their indices.209 These index providers acted despite evi-

the S&P 500”). But see Benjamin Bennett, René M. Stulz & Zexi Wang, Does Joining the
S&P 500 Index Hurt Firms? 1–5 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2020-03-017, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3656628 [https://perma.cc/L647-N4D5] (ﬁnding that the
long-run impact of index inclusion is negative).
204. Robertson, (Mis)Uses, supra note 202, at 1–4; S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P 500
(USD) Factsheet (July 30, 2021), https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp500/#overview (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
205. See Robertson, (Mis)Uses, supra note 202, at 1, 4, 6–8.
206. Governance, S&P Dow Jones Indices, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/
governance/ [https://perma.cc/U4GN-2YUB] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
207. Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index”
Investing, 36 Yale J. on Regul. 795, 846 (2019).
208. See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 B.U.
L. Rev. 1229, 1246 (2019) (exploring the conﬂicts of interest that index providers face);
Robertson, (Mis)Uses, supra note 202, at 6–7, 23 (describing the changing methodology
and composition of the index and the competing client interests depending on use for
index funds or benchmarks).
209. See Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71
Stan. L. Rev. 687, 692 (2019) [hereinafter Lund, Nonvoting Shares].
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dence that these structures may in fact aid rather than harm ﬁrm performance.210 Instead, the choice seems to have been a response to pressure
from CII, as well as major mutual fund providers, who were concerned
about the erosion of shareholder rights in the wake of Snap Inc.’s controversial public offering.211 This example suggests that when index providers
take a stand on governance issues, they are likely to supply another source
of pressure in favor of their client-shareholders’ interests.
7. Ratings Agencies. — A credit rating agency is an organization that
rates companies and their securities on a scale in exchange for a fee.212
They are substantial drivers of demand for company debt and equity products because many institutional investors are limited to purchasing investment-grade products.213 In addition, investors generally view credit ratings
as a reﬂection of the health of the underlying company.214 Therefore, the
models used by credit ratings providers can be quite inﬂuential.
All three major credit ratings providers—Moody’s, Fitch Ratings, and
S&P—integrate “good governance” criteria into their rating models.215 A
study of the corporate governance methodology used by these and two
other ratings agencies found that a principal rating factor is the extent to
which the company protects shareholder rights and aligns management
and shareholder interests.216 This is particularly surprising in light of the
210. See, e.g., Scott W. Bauguess, Myron B. Slovin & Marie E. Sushka, Large Shareholder
Diversiﬁcation, Corporate Risk Taking, and the Beneﬁts of Changing to Differential Voting
Rights, 36 J. Banking & Fin. 1244, 1244–46 (2012) (ﬁnding superior industry-adjusted performance in connection with a change to differential voting rights and sale of insider economic interests); Valentin Dimitrov & Prem C. Jain, Recapitalization of One Class of
Common Stock Into Dual-Class: Growth and Long-Run Stock Returns, 12 J. Corp. Fin. 342,
346–47 (2006) (suggesting that dual-class structures might enhance value); Ronald C.
Anderson, Ezgi Ottolenghi & David M. Reeb, The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair (Fox
Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 17-021, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006669
[https://perma.cc/ZDA2-599N] (ﬁnding that dual-class family ﬁrms yield excess stock
returns of nearly 350 basis points per year).
211. Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 210, at 691.
212. See Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F: How the Credit Rating Agencies Failed
America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1275, 1279 (2009); see
also Frank Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong With Credit Ratings?, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1407, 1410
(2017). Research analysts serve a similar function, issuing earnings projections and providing company ratings for a fee. These analyst projections provide another source of pressure
on management to maximize shareholder wealth. James J. Park, From Managers to Markets:
Valuation and Shareholder Wealth Maximization 40–45, (UCLA Sch. of L.,
Law & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 20-09, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731764
[https://perma.cc/E66P-8GMU].
213. See Mulligan, supra note 213, at 1277–78. For discussions of how banks and creditors have also played a role in U.S. corporate governance, see generally Jeremy McClane,
Corporate Non-Governance, 44 Del. J. Corp. L. 1 (2020); Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick
Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else Matters for Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank
Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 991 (2008).
214. Mulligan, supra note 213, at 1278–79.
215. Amir Louizi & Radhouane Kammoun, Evaluation of Corporate Governance
Systems by Credit Rating Agencies, 20 J. Mgmt. & Governance 363, 364 (2016).
216. Id. at 365–75.
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fact that creditor and shareholder interests often diverge.217 In addition,
several credit ratings providers also offer governance grades.218 For example, Morningstar grades companies based on “shareholder friendliness,”
“transparency,” and a third category that asks whether ﬁrms have
“consistently treated shareholders with respect.”219
Beyond credit ratings providers, other market players offer assessments of the governance quality of an organization to aid institutional
investors in their purchasing and voting decisions. For the past twenty
years, the proxy advisor ISS has provided company governance ratings for
a fee.220 These ratings have undergone several name changes but are
known today as the “ISS Governance QualityScore.”221 Each day, ISS
announces updated scores based on four categories: Board Structure,
Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Audit & Risk Oversight. In each
category, the company receives points for responsiveness to shareholders.222 Stakeholders, by contrast, are neglected: Only once in the 199-page
scoring report are stakeholders mentioned at all—in a section on
accounting restatements that “pose a material risk to shareholders and/or
stakeholders.”223
There is evidence that these governance ratings, like credit ratings,
substantially affect trading decisions—a recent study determined that a
QualityScore downgrade by ISS has a signiﬁcant negative impact on stock
returns.224 In other words, a company that wants to avoid a negative governance score and corresponding repercussions would do well to adhere
to the governance guidelines adopted by ISS.225 Therefore, these market
217. See, e.g., Rock, Shareholder-Centric Reality, supra note 83, at 1967–78 (discussing
the conﬂict between shareholders and creditors in anticipation of a company’s looming
bankruptcy).
218. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. Corp. L. 887, 905–06 (2007).
Ratings agencies have also started to provide ESG ratings. Billy Nauman, Credit Rating
Agencies Join Battle for ESG Supremacy, Fin. Times (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/59f60306-d671-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review).
219. Rose, supra note 219, at 905; see also Stewardship Grade, Morningstar,
https://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/stewardship_grade.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Q48M-YEX6] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
220. Rose, supra note 219, at 900.
221. ISS ESG, Governance QualityScore: Methodology Guide 4 (2021), https://
www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/products/qualityscore-techdoc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DNM7-AN6E].
222. See id. at 13–44 (board structure); id. at 44–70 (compensation); id. at 70–94
(shareholder rights); id at. 94–104 (audit and risk oversight).
223. Id. at 96.
224. Paul M. Guest & Marco Nerino, Do Corporate Governance Ratings Change
Investor Expectations? Evidence From Announcements by Institutional Shareholder
Services, 24 Rev. Fin. 891, 893 (2020) (ﬁnding that rating downgrades by ISS are associated
with negative announcement returns of “–1.14% over a 3-day announcement window”).
225. Academics have also created inﬂuential indices that gauge governance quality,
again, with a focus on shareholders as the deﬁning feature of good governance. These
include the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick G index and the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell E
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forces provide an additional source of pressure on companies to advance
shareholder interests.
The previous sections explored how corporate governance is substantially inﬂuenced by various sources of law and a number of extralegal
institutional players. These actors are in turn shaped by, and participate
in, cultural forces—the topic we turn to next.
C.

Culture

Culture, the ﬁnal component of the corporate governance machine,
may be the most inﬂuential of all.226 Although highly contestable and
notoriously hard to pin down, culture has been deﬁned as “the total
shared, learned behavior of a society or a subgroup.”227 Nobel Prize winner
Oliver Williamson’s model of social analysis puts culture at the very top, at
the level of “social embeddedness.”228 He observes that change at this level
happens slowly and that culture has a pervasive inﬂuence on the levels
below, such as legal rules and company governance structures.229
Comparative corporate governance scholars have similarly observed the
important interaction between culture and law.230 In particular, these
scholars have noted how culture drives the choice of legal rules and
corporate ownership structures.231 Culture also shapes the practices
adopted by institutional players, as the previous section explored.
Many informal affiliations and institutions are responsible for transmitting the culture of corporate governance in the United States, and in
this section we focus on three—professional education, the media, and

index. Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson & Darius Palia, The Core Corporate Governance
Puzzle: Contextualizing the Link to Performance, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1995, 2035 (2019).
226. Cf. Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage 13 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001)
(emphasizing “the importance of informal rules and understandings to securing the
equilibria in the many strategic interactions of the political economy”).
227. Margaret Mead, The Study of Culture at a Distance, in The Study of Culture at a
Distance 3, 22 (Margaret Mead & Rhoda Métreaux eds., 1953).
228. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. Econ. Literature 595, 596 (2000).
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate Governance, in The Oxford
Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance 129, 129–58 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018); Amir N. Licht & Renée B. Adams, Shareholders and Stakeholders Around
the World: The Role of Values, Culture and Law in Directors’ Decisions 18–19 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 459/2019, 2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3407873 [https://perma.cc/6RCM-6HMS].
231. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 168 (1999); Amir N. Licht,
Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25
Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 229, 232–36 (2005); René M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture,
Openness, and Finance, 70 J. Fin. Econ. 313, 316–21 (2003).

2021]

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MACHINE

2603

political associations.232 As the following discussion reveals, each has contributed to establishing shareholder primacy as the guiding norm for
ﬁduciary conduct.
1. Professional Education. — Academic institutions, particularly business and law schools, inﬂuence how future corporate ﬁduciaries perceive
their roles. For the past few decades, these institutions have imparted the
view that increasing shareholder value is the chief business objective.233
Although it has not gone unchallenged, shareholder value “is the leitmotif
of ﬁnance teaching and implicit throughout the rest of the curriculum” at
most business schools.234 In addition, legal nuances have often been lost
in translation, such as when shareholder primacy is reduced to a message
of maximizing short-term stock price.235
Researchers pinpoint this shift as starting in the 1970s, “a volatile
time” for “the managerial class” as well as business schools.236 During this
time, economists and other scholars began to frame the debate in terms
of agency costs and forcefully push the view that managers should focus
on shareholder wealth maximization.237 Within a decade, “business
schools that had been preaching something very different since their
founding days” turned toward shareholder capitalism.238

232. For a broader investigation of the inﬂuence of culture on corporate governance,
see Licht et al., supra note 232, at 232–36.
233. See, e.g., Darrell West, Brookings Inst., The Purpose of the Corporation in Business
and Law Curricula 4 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
0719_corporation_west.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TZ8-PFZB] (“The dominant ‘law and
economics’ conception taught in many schools emphasizes proﬁt maximization and
enhancing shareholder value.”).
234. N. Craig Smith & Luk Van Wassenhove, How Business Schools Lost Their Way,
Bloomberg (Jan. 11, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-01-11/howbusiness-schools-lost-their-way (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Mayer, supra
note 1, at 2 (noting that the “Friedman doctrine” of shareholder wealth maximization “has
been the basis of business education that has moulded generations of business leaders”).
235. See Rock, Debate Over Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 386 (“While lawyers,
judges, and law professors would all explain that interpreting Revlon as requiring that boards
maximize short-term stock price is a badly inaccurate description, many directors apparently
believe it anyway.”); see also Eduardo Porter, Motivating Corporations to Do Good, N.Y.
Times (July 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/business/the-do-goodcorporation.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Though legally dubious, the
argument that it is an executive’s ﬁduciary duty to maximize the company’s share price
became a mantra from the business school to the boardroom.”).
236. Duff McDonald, The Golden Passport: Harvard Business School, the Limits of
Capitalism, and the Moral Failure of the MBA Elite 353 (2017) (citing Harvard Business
School as an example of a school that enjoyed prosperity in the 1960s before ﬁnding itself
in “serious ﬁnancial straits” by 1970).
237. See id. at 360–67 (discussing the introduction of “the concept of the executive as
‘agent’ of the company’s shareholders”); see also supra section I.B (discussing the rise of
agency cost theory and shareholder primacy starting in the 1970s).
238. McDonald, supra note 237, at 367; see also N. Craig Smith & David Rönnegard,
Shareholder Primacy, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Role of Business Schools,
134 J. Bus. Ethics 463, 471–73 (2016); cf. Eells, Government of Corporations, supra note 33,
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As a telling example, Harvard Business School hired Michael Jensen,
an early proponent of the view that minimizing agency costs between
shareholders and management is a key goal of corporate governance.239
Jensen incorporated agency theory into one of the most popular courses
in the curriculum and minimized the previously dominant model that
emphasized managerial discretion.240 Others followed this approach and
leading ﬁnance texts began to present shareholder value maximization as
the widely accepted understanding of corporate purpose.241 This educational focus became pervasive: A 2011 study of top law and business schools
found that classes that teach the purpose of the corporation emphasize
the goal of maximizing shareholder value.242
Not only that, around the same time, scholars in law and ﬁnance
began to use event studies of stock price reactions to evaluate governance
reform.243 This development further entrenched the shareholder wealth
maximization norm because a governance practice would be deemed
value enhancing only if it boosted the company’s share price. And scholars
passed down these tenets to future business executives, who learned that
governance quality is closely tied to shareholder value and proﬁtmaximization in particular.244

at vii (arguing in the 1960s that business schools should teach the “governance of corporations” so the “top business leaders of tomorrow will . . . conceive of their task in larger terms
than efficient administration for production alone and accept their responsibilities as officers of private governmental systems”). A similar transformation occurred in law schools.
Alexander Styhre, The Making of the Shareholder Primacy Governance Model: Price
Theory, the Law and Economics School, and Corporate Law Retrenchment Advocacy, 8
Acct. Econ. & L., Jan. 2017, at 1, 24 (“[T]he contributions made by the Chicago law and
economics research work . . . gradually penetrated law schools and business schools . . . .”).
239. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text; see also Brian R. Cheffins, What
Jensen and Meckling Really Said About the Public Company 3, 22 (Univ. of Cambridge Fac.
of L., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 29/2020, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3679405
[https://perma.cc/VT2V-AJR3] (tracing Jensen’s work and views).
240. McDonald, supra note 237, at 367.
241. See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of
Corporate Finance 8 (13th ed. 2020) (“The goal of maximizing shareholder value is widely
accepted in both theory and practice.”).
242. West, supra note 234, at 3, 14 (ﬁnding that in a survey of the “top 20 business and
top 20 law schools as rated by media publications,” students viewed “maximizing
shareholder value” as the highest responsibility of a company).
243. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law, Part II:
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 380, 380 (2002) (explaining “the
goal of corporate law is to increase shareholder wealth, and event studies provide a metric
for measurement of the impact upon stock prices of policy decisions”); see also Robert
Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 353, 405 (2020) (discussing “the growing use and reliance on Simple q as a proxy for ﬁrm value” and how it has
been used in “a large body of empirical scholarship” to “draw conclusions about what
constitutes ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ corporate governance”).
244. See, e.g., Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social
Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulﬁlled Promise of Management
as a Profession 364 (2007) (“[B]usiness school professors instructed thousands of students
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Professional education has served a potent avenue of social transmission: Studies show that when students enter business school, they tend to
believe that the purpose of a corporation is to produce goods and services
for the beneﬁt of society, but by the time they graduate, they are more
likely to believe its purpose is to maximize shareholder value.245 These
graduates in business and law go on to run and advise U.S. public corporations, from the top leadership position down to the newest hire. As such,
the norms passed along in graduate education are enormously inﬂuential
in corporate decisionmaking.246
2. Media. — The media has also played an important role in propelling the shareholder primacy view forward. To take a famous example, the
New York Times Magazine selected for publication Friedman’s 1970 essay,
which is often credited with catalyzing the shareholder primacy
movement.247 In the decades that followed, hostile acquirers battled the
press who labeled them “corporate raiders” who bled the economy.248
Academics and other shareholder primacy proponents, however, countered these early reactions by advancing the agency costs view that
takeovers disciplined wayward management and created shareholder
value, with a beneﬁcial effect on the economy.249 This narrative seeped
into mainstream coverage, which evolved to evaluate corporate actions in
terms of whether they are value creating for shareholders.
As broader evidence of shareholder primacy’s stronghold, consider
how the media generally focuses on short-term stock market movements
not just as evidence of management’s capabilities but also of the health of
the overall economy. To take a recent example, during the COVID-19
pandemic, news articles covered the peaks and troughs in the stock market
as a sign of the country’s economic outlook, despite signs of divergence.250

and executives on how to use ﬁnancial engineering tools, like leverage and stock options,
to align corporate actions with the goal of maximizing shareholder value.”).
245. McDonald, supra note 237, at 370.
246. West, supra note 234, at 3 (“If schools emphasize a particular set of values or
approaches, it will reverberate for decades to come.”). See generally Neil Fligstein & Doug
McAdam, A Theory of Fields 79–80 (2012) (theorizing social change and identifying
“higher education and professionals” as key inﬂuencers).
247. Aaron Brown, Opinion, Shareholder Primacy Means Shareholders Are Paid Last,
Bloomberg (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-0905/shareholder-primacy-means-shareholders-are-paid-last (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
248. See, e.g., Leonard Silk, The Peril Behind the Takeover Boom, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1985, at F1, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/29/business/the-peril-behind-thetakeover-boom.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
249. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.
1984, https://hbr.org/1984/11/takeovers-folklore-and-science [https://perma.cc/8HL8DXAY].
250. See, e.g., Greg Rosalsky, What Is the Stock Market Trying to Tell Us?, NPR (June
16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2020/06/16/877410547/what-is-thestock-market-trying-to-tell-us [https://perma.cc/YU8N-KDYQ] (“Economists consider the
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The media’s focus on share price and market performance is likely
explained by the same intuitive simplicity that has resulted in shareholder
primacy’s lasting power elsewhere. As Lynn Stout explained, “[t]o the popular press and business media, shareholder primacy offered an easy-toexplain, sound-bite description of what corporations are and what they are
supposed to do.”251 And, “[t]o businesspeople and reformers seeking a
way to distinguish between good and bad governance practices, the shareholder-centric view promised a single, easily-read measure of corporate
performance in the form of share price.”252
In short, the language of shareholder primacy gave the business press
an easily accessible frame to weigh in on company management via comparisons to a simple lodestar—shareholder value and, speciﬁcally, share
price maximization.253 That is not to say that all media coverage has
favored shareholders, but that over time, the cultural acceptance of shareholder primacy as a desirable objective for the ﬁrm has bled into business
reporting that appears neutral but, in reality, embeds many assumptions
about the proper corporate objective.
3. Politics. — Finally, corporate governance reﬂects the political environment.254 There are no universal principles of how politics align with
issues of corporate governance, but scholars have identiﬁed some interesting patterns. In general, shareholder primacy has its roots in right-ofcenter thinking, whereas stakeholder models are embraced by politicians
on the left side of the aisle.255 Nonetheless, in the United States, both
groups increasingly converged on shareholder primacy over the past two
decades: As labor and pension funds used their growing governance power
to advance their political interests,256 left-of-center politicians embraced
the expansion of shareholder rights.257 This trend solidiﬁed after the
stock market a ‘leading indicator’ of the economy, meaning it often signals where the real
economy is headed.”).
251. Stout, New Thinking, supra note 71, at 3.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political
Context, Corporate Impact 4 (2003) [hereinafter Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate
Governance] (observing that the incidence of hostile takeovers, proxy ﬁghts, and incentivebased compensation are determined by “nation-by-nation speciﬁcs”).
255. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 857–58 (1997);
Bruner, supra note 101, at 267. For a discussion of how state corporate law can engender
partisan politics and how Delaware has used a perceived nonpartisan approach to its strategic advantage, see generally Ofer Eldar & Gabriel Rauterberg, Is Corporate Law
Nonpartisan? (June 24, 2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (unpublished
manuscript).
256. Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism, supra note 149.
257. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare,
36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 489, 513–14 (2013) (describing the “progressive overlay” of shareholder politics and the shared interests between labor and equity); Bruner, supra note 101,
at 286 (“Since the turn of the millennium, shareholder-centric corporate governance
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Enron accounting scandal and the ﬁnancial crisis, which sparked criticism
of ineffective monitoring mechanisms and a lack of managerial
accountability to shareholder interests.258 In the wake of these crises,
liberal and conservative politicians united in passing corporate
governance reform that strengthened shareholder power259 and
incorporated additional mechanisms to ensure that management
prioritized shareholder interests.260
Another reason for this convergence is the shift from deﬁned beneﬁt
to deﬁned contribution retirement plans that rendered millions of working Americans forced investors in the stock market.261 As the previous
section discusses, this trend has increased the power and inﬂuence of
institutional investors who manage these assets and wield the governance
rights of American workers. It has also entrenched shareholder primacy
across both sides of the political aisle: Elected officials understand that
shareholder value creation affects not only the wealthiest one percent but
also the millions of Americans who are investors through their pension
funds and 401(k) accounts.262 Moreover, the “rhetoric of shareholder
value” is politically powerful when “the interests and perceptions of the
investor class [are] viewed, however questionably, as largely coterminous
with those of the citizenry at large.”263 This framing helps at times to forge
alliances at the national level between ﬁnancial and labor interests, supporting governmental responses ranging from enacting shareholderfocused corporate governance legislation to buttressing large corporations
and securities markets.264
reforms at the federal level have picked up pace, and such reforms have uniformly emerged
from the political left.”).
258. Mirela V. Hristova, Dodd-Frank’s Corporate Governance Reform, 30 Rev. Banking
& Fin. L. 516, 517 (2011).
259. Id. at 519–26 (detailing Dodd–Frank’s attempts to promote increased
accountability).
260. See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate
Governance Reform, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 855, 883–84 (2003). For an argument that
rising populist sentiment is unlikely to result in signiﬁcant change in the law of corporate
purpose, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era, 98 Neb. L. Rev.
543, 577 (2019).
261. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 83, at 881–82 (discussing how the rise of deﬁned
contribution plans increased the incidence of shareholding by ordinary Americans).
262. Bruner, supra note 101, at 267; Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of
Shareholder Primacy, 43 Seton Hall L. Rev. 909, 911 (2013) (arguing that “changes in the
pension system helped to transform corporate governance into a system dominated by the
shareholder interest”).
263. John W. Cioffi, Public Law and Private Power: Corporate Governance Reform in
the Age of Finance Capitalism 110–16 (2010).
264. See Bruner, supra note 101, at 322–24 (describing the “coalition of ﬁnancial and
labor interests” that “allies shareholders and employees against management” and ties the
framing to “interests and perceived vulnerabilities of the ‘middle class’” to catalyze passage
of legislation such as Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank); David T. Zaring, The
Government’s Economic Response to the COVID-19 Crisis 4 (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3662049
[https://perma.cc/2HKU-37RC]
(unpublished
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From professional education and the media to politics, cultural elements work together to perpetuate shareholder primacy as the governing
norm in the United States. The lack of global convergence toward a shareholder primacy model suggests that the orientation of the corporate governance machine should not be taken for granted—culture appears to be
a driving force.
Of all the corporate governance machine’s components, however,
culture appears to be the most in ﬂux. Academic institutions are
increasingly coming under ﬁre for teaching shareholder primacy at the
exclusion of other viewpoints, and many are beginning to offer courses
exploring sustainability, ESG, and stakeholder models.265 Prominent
scholars and professionals in business and law are likewise calling for
change.266 Norms have shifted quickly among S&P 500 companies toward
voluntary reporting of social responsibility and sustainability efforts.267 In
turn, media outlets are increasingly observing that a shift away from
shareholder primacy is taking place.268 And ﬁnally, political parties, both

manuscript) (describing the Federal Reserve Board and Treasury Department responses to
“sustain the U.S. economy amidst the pandemic”); Matt Phillips, Too Big to Fail: The Entire
Private Sector, N.Y. Times (May 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/19/
business/too-big-to-fail-wall-street-businesses.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(“In a bid to soften the coronavirus’s economic blow, the government has stretched its
ﬁnancial safety net wide—from strategically sensitive companies, to entire industries such as
energy and airlines, to the market for corporate bonds.”).
265. Alternative management perspectives have also gained inﬂuence. See, e.g., Michael
E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2011,
https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-idea-creating-shared-value [https://perma.cc/B222-PXHE].
266. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 152, at 662 (“There is now a growing recognition that
the model of stockholder primacy is no longer acceptable, and that corporations must focus
on broader corporate purposes, beyond stockholder value.”).
267. See Flash Report: 86% of S&P 500 Index Companies Publish
Sustainability/Responsibility Reports in 2018, Governance & Accountability Inst., Inc. (May
16, 2019), https://www.ga-institute.com/press-releases/article/ﬂash-report-86-of-sp-500indexR-companies-publish-sustainability-responsibility-reports-in-20.html
[https://perma.cc/8ATQ-MY4J] (“During the year 2011, just under 20% of S&P 500
companies reported on their sustainability, corporate social responsibility . . . [while] for
[the] year 2018, the total inched up to 86% of S&P 500 companies reporting.”).
268. See, e.g., Steve Denning, Why Maximizing Shareholder Value Is Finally Dying,
Forbes (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2019/08/19/whymaximizing-shareholder-value-is-ﬁnally-dying [https://perma.cc/U63K-8HXY] (observing
the media “hubbub” around the Business Roundtable’s embrace of stakeholders); Moral
Money, Fin. Times, https://www.ft.com/moral-money (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (biweekly newsletter on “the fast-expanding world of socially responsible business . . . [and] (ESG) trends”) (last visited Aug. 10, 2021); Alan Murray & David Meyer, The
End of Shareholder Primacy: CEO Daily, Fortune (Aug. 19, 2019), https://fortune.com/
2019/08/19/the-end-of-shareholder-primacy-ceo-daily
[https://perma.cc/59KZ-M85B]
(arguing that the shareholder primacy model has been “scrapp[ed]”).
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from the right and left, have begun to attack shareholder primacy and
offer proposals for change.269
It remains to be seen, however, whether cultural change can by itself
manifest a shift away from shareholder primacy and whether other elements of the corporate governance machine will eventually catch on. And
as Part IV discusses in greater detail, we suspect that the complementary
institutional components that enshrine shareholderism will hamper a shift
to a new paradigm if cultural forces alone are at play. Instead, we suspect
that a shift in culture would need to drive concrete legal and institutional
changes and alter multiple components of the machine if a paradigm shift
were to manifest.
III. HOW THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MACHINE WORKS
The previous Part identiﬁes the components of the corporate governance machine and hints at their reinforcing nature. This Part builds on
this foundation and demonstrates how the corporate governance machine
operates to force certain changes on companies and policymakers alike
using three detailed examples. First, we explore how the corporate governance machine inﬂuenced the path of law and extralegal institutional
standards to homogenize public company boards of directors consistent
with a monitoring model. Second, we show that the corporate governance
machine transformed the concept of corporate social responsibility into
shareholder value–oriented ESG and, in so doing, propelled it to the mainstream. And third and ﬁnally, we demonstrate how the corporate governance machine forced alternative conceptions of corporate purpose into an
entirely separate form of incorporation—the beneﬁt corporation.
A.

Public Company Boards

What is the function of the board of directors? At one point in time,
corporate directors were envisioned as socially responsive trustees, helping
management chart the right course of action for the company.270 Indeed,
in the 1950s—the “heyday of stakeholder capitalism and corporate
managerialism”—corporate boards were composed of corporate insiders,
with a sprinkling of outsiders with a variety of economic relationships with
the company.271 There was also a concerted effort not to align boards solely
with shareholder interests as doing so “would undercut the desirable
capacity of managers to manage in the public interest.”272
In the 1970s, things changed. As Part I discusses, a series of corporate
scandals brought to light how passively boards discharged their duties,
269. See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465,
1510–13 (2007) [hereinafter Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors].
271. Id. at 1511, 1513.
272. Id. at 1514–15.
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leading to a revisiting of the board’s function.273 Combined with early literature in law and economics, the board’s role became to constrain managerial opportunism and minimize the agency problem created by the
separation of ownership and control.274
This “monitoring” model took off. The American Law Institute (ALI)
endorsed the monitoring function in its draft Principles of Corporate
Governance, which suggested that at least a majority of the board should
be independent directors.275 This endorsement was not without controversy, however—the Principles project was drawn out and “resembled the
rough-and-tumble politics of a state legislature.”276 But over time, the monitoring model won out, as legal and institutional players continued to push
for board independence. For example, around the same time that the ALI
ﬁnalized its Principles, the chairpersons of the SEC and the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws embraced the view that the chief function
of the board is to monitor management for the beneﬁt of shareholders.277
The hostile takeover wave of the 1980s further solidiﬁed this development,
as pursuit of shareholder value became the all-encompassing guide for
corporate behavior.278
From then on, legal reform of the board of directors took a predictable tack. For example, the collapse of Enron and WorldCom led multiple
players within the corporate governance machine to adopt more stringent
independence requirements for directors. Although the root cause of
these collapses were accounting failures, reformers blamed corporate
boards for failing to stop managers from eroding gatekeeper integrity.279
In response, the NYSE convened a corporate governance task force that
generated strict director independence requirements as a precondition to
being listed.280 Shortly thereafter, Congress adopted the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002, which requires the SEC to prohibit U.S. stock exchanges from
listing securities unless the company had an audit committee composed
solely of independent directors.281

273. See id.; see also supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text (describing the Penn
Central bankruptcy and other corporate scandals).
274. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 271, at 1518–20.
275. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice
160 (2008) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance].
276. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1034, 1044 (1993).
277. See Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Com., 94th Cong. 301–32 (1976) (statement of Roderick Hills, Chairman, SEC); ABA
Comm. on Corp. L., Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 Bus. Law. 1591, 1619–20 (1978)
(“[T]he board of directors is . . . [the] reviewer of management initiatives and monitor of
corporate performance . . . .”).
278. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 271, at 1527–28, 1540.
279. Id. at 1539.
280. Id.; NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303 (amended July 18, 2019).
281. Audit Committees and Auditor Independence, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/info/
accountants/audit042707.htm [https://perma.cc/X9ZU-M9F6] (last updated May 7, 2007).
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On top of this legal reform, proxy advisors ratcheted up pressure on
corporate boards to increase board independence. For example, ISS’s
2019 voting guidelines state: “Boards should be sufficiently independent
from management . . . to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management’s performance for the beneﬁt of all shareholders.”282 ISS enforces these policies by committing to recommend
voting against insider directors when independent directors make up 50%
or less of the board or an insider director serves on the audit,
compensation, or nominating committees.283
These legal and extralegal changes led to a dramatic shift in board
composition. From 1950 to the mid-2000s, the fraction of independent
directors on large U.S. public company boards increased from approximately 20% to 75%.284 That is so despite the fact that there is far from universal consensus that director independence leads to better board
decisionmaking and oversight.285 Yet the corporate governance machine
pushed for this result. Speciﬁcally, after ideas incubated in academia led
to an evolving cultural understanding of corporate governance, major
institutional players—including the SEC, the stock exchanges, and inﬂuential proxy advisors—adopted rules that brought the monitoring model
into the mainstream. By force of these developments, all U.S. public company corporate boards have a signiﬁcant percentage of independent

282. ISS, United States Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Recommendations
8
(2019),
https://www.issgovernance.com/ﬁle/policy/active/americas/US-VotingGuidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/423R-TFNS].
283. Id.
284. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 271, at 1471.
285. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence
Listing Standards 1–2 (UCLA Sch. of L., Rsch. Paper No. 02-15, 2002),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=317121 [https://perma.cc/K29Z-KQE3] (describing the
NYSE’s proposals for increased director independence as “the warmed-over rejects of past
corporate governance ‘reform’ initiatives”); see also Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law.
921, 942 (1999) (“Most studies ﬁnd little correlation [between board composition and ﬁrm
performance], but a number of recent studies report evidence of a negative correlation
between the proportion of independent directors and ﬁrm performance—the exact opposite of conventional wisdom.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96
Iowa L. Rev. 127, 193 (2010) (arguing that “reliance on independent directors has been
inappropriately used to substitute for rigorous external regulation”); Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0: An Introduction, 74 Bus. Law. 351, 351–54 (2019) (arguing
the dominant “monitoring board” of independent directors has “fallen short” and should
be replaced with a new model of “thickly informed, well-resourced, and highly motivated
directors”).
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directors286 and view their role as safeguarding the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders.287
B.

The ESG Movement

Our next example begins in the Great Depression, when Professors
Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd famously debated corporate purpose.
Berle’s view was that managers should exercise power “only for the ratable
beneﬁt of all the shareholders,”288 while Dodd argued that the corporation
“has a social service as well as a proﬁt-making function.”289 In the wake of
that debate, Dodd appeared to be the victor.290 During the mid-twentieth
century period of managerial capitalism, corporate charitable giving
became accepted practice and corporate managers acknowledged that
businesses had social obligations.291 In the 1950s, economist Howard
Bowen coined the term “corporate social responsibility” out of a concern
for corporate power and its impact on society.292 His view was squarely
aligned with Dodd’s: He deﬁned the social responsibilities of management
as “the obligations of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those
decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of
the objectives and values of our society.”293
286. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Corporate Governance Gap, 131 Yale L.J.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
42),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824857
[https://perma.cc/S33E-X7QW] (showing that all public company boards have a large
percentage of independent directors).
287. See, e.g., Corp. L. Comm., ABA Bus. L. Section, Corporate Director’s Guidebook—
Seventh Edition, 75 Bus. Law. 2741, 2748 (2020) (“In determining the corporation’s ‘best
interests,’ directors should have in mind the interests of the shareholders as a whole.”);
OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 45 (2015) https://www.oecd.org/
corporate/principles-corporate-governance/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence
and care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders.”).
288. A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1049
(1931).
289. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 Harv. L.
Rev. 1145, 1148 (1932).
290. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 169 (1954)
(acknowledging that the debate “ha[d] been settled (at least for the time being) squarely
in favor of Professor Dodd’s contention”).
291. Howard R. Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman 125–27 (1953).
292. See id. at 6; see also Archie B. Carroll, A History of Corporate Social Responsibility:
Concepts and Practices, in The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility 19, 25
(Andrew Crane, Dirk Matten, Abagail McWilliams, Jeremy Moon & Donald S. Siegel eds.,
2008) (“[Howard] Bowen’s publication of his landmark book Social Responsibilities of the
Businessman (1953) best marks the beginnings of the modern period of literature on this
subject.”).
293. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance, in The
Cambridge Handbook of Compliance 662, 663 (Benjamin van Rooij & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2021) (quoting Howard E. Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman 6 (1953)); see
also Ming-Dong Paul Lee, A Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its
Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead, 10 Int’l J. Mgmt. Revs. 53, 56–58 (2008) (discussing
Bowen’s view of corporate social responsibility).
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This view persisted in mainstream thinking for several decades. As in
our previous example, however, much changed in the 1970s. Increasing
adherence to the perspective famously espoused by Friedman—that a
company’s responsibility is to maximize shareholder proﬁt—
corresponded with a marginalization of corporate social responsibility and
a new direction in research. This started with scholars in the 1980s who
began to discuss corporate social responsibility as a decisionmaking
process and explore how it could be operationalized through various
frameworks, models, and evaluation methods.294 And these models
eventually began to rely on the link between corporate social responsibility
and ﬁnancial performance.295
By the early 2000s, researchers continued to explore the link between
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and ﬁnancial performance, accruing
evidence of the “business case” for CSR. This led to a reframing—CSR was
not bad for business, but good; therefore, the obligation to engage in CSR
was part and parcel of management’s duties to its shareholders. Around
this time, CSR was largely recast as ESG and therefore inextricably linked
with governance. The term ESG was coined by the United Nations
following its 2005 conference “Who Cares Wins,” which brought together
institutional investors, ﬁnancial analysts, consultants, and regulators.296
The report that followed made the case that integrating ESG factors into
corporate and investor decisionmaking was critical for the security of
investments, prosperity, and growing markets.297 Shortly after, in
collaboration with an international group representing institutional
investors, the United Nations launched at the New York Stock Exchange
the “Principles for Responsible Investment,” promoting the integration of
ESG issues within the investment industry.298
294. See, e.g., Mauricio Andrés Latapí Agudelo, Lára Jóhannsdóttir & Brynhildur
Davídsdóttir, A Literature Review of the History and Evolution of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 4 Int’l J. Corp. Soc. Resp. 1, 7 (2019) (citing Thomas M. Jones, Corporate
Social Responsibility Revisited, Redeﬁned, 22 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 59, 60–62 (1980)) (noting
that Jones was the “ﬁrst author to consider CSR as a decision making process that
inﬂuence[s] corporate behavior”).
295. See, e.g., Philip L. Cochran & Robert A. Wood, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Financial Performance, 27 Acad. Mgmt. J. 42, 43–48 (1984) (describing the use of a reputation index to explore the link between CSR and ﬁnancial performance); Frank Tuzzolino
& Barry R. Armandi, A Need-Hierarchy Framework for Assessing Corporate Social
Responsibility, 6 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 21, 22 (1981) (assessing CSR based on proﬁtability).
296. See generally onValues Inv. Strategies & Rsch. Ltd., UN Glob. Compact, Investing
for Long-Term Value: Integrating Environmental, Social and Governance Value Drivers in
Asset Management and Financial Research (2005), https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/
16876744?access_key=key-mfg3d0usaiuaob4taki (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(detailing the conference goals, key outcomes, and insights).
297. Id. at iii.
298. About the PRI, Principles for Responsible Inv., https://www.unpri.org/about-thepri [https://perma.cc/GLM6-P9EX] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021); see also Harper Ho,
Enlightened Shareholder Value, supra note 13, at 81–82 (describing the PRI); Mariana
Pargendler, The Rise of International Corporate Law (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
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Many players in the corporate governance system embraced this move
and solidiﬁed it. First, the move to value-enhancing ESG was squarely consistent with the law in Delaware. Even scholars who advance a shareholder
primacy view have agreed that boards of directors have signiﬁcant discretion in nearly all circumstances to exercise their business judgment and
that pursuing stakeholder interests can create value. Thus, valueenhancing ESG threaded the needle in terms of legal debates and was
supported by the legal community. And although the move to valueenhancing ESG arguably narrowed the range of public-minded activities
that companies might pursue, CSR advocates may have been willing to
accept the ESG movement, as previous efforts to change corporate
behavior had made limited inroads. In other words, in a world anchored
to shareholder primacy, advocates of CSR may have realized that many
lawmakers and legal advisors would only support reform that was framed
as value-maximizing ESG.299
Second, market players ran with the concept. As investors started to
accept the notion that integrating ESG measures could mitigate risk and
create shareholder value,300 various institutions realized they could supply
metrics and other services for a fee. As a result, ratings agencies began
providing ESG metrics, institutional investors offered ESG funds, and
thousands of investment professionals billed themselves as “ESG
analysts.”301 ESG became a business opportunity.
Law
Working
Paper
No
555/2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3728650
[https://perma.cc/TL9Y-YAJX] (last updated Nov. 30, 2020) (describing the rise of ESG
prompted by UN initiatives). Around this time, the United Nations also launched the
Principles for Responsible Investment and the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative. Who
We Are, Sustainable Stock Exchs. Initiative, https://sseinitiative.org/about
[https://perma.cc/JH7B-42NQ] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021).
299. See, e.g., Beate Sjåfell & Christopher M. Bruner, Corporations and Sustainability,
in The Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law, Corporate Governance and Sustainability
3, 4 (Beate Sjåfell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2020) (distinguishing the “weak
sustainability” view, which integrates ESG into the “mainstream” focus on long-term
ﬁnancial performance, from “strong sustainability” which “simply means actual
sustainability”).
300. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 16, at 1410 (claiming that “[s]ocial risks arise
when a company makes a business choice that exempliﬁes, epitomizes, or overlooks challenges rattling large societal groups, whole areas of economic activity, or even society as a
whole”); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring
Nonﬁnancial Risk, 41 J. Corp. L. 647, 684–85 (2016) (proposing that “[m]ore widespread
integration of ESG measures into standard investment analysis would address several
important structural objections to risk-related activism”).
301. See Joseph A. Hall & Betty M. Huber, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, ESG in the US:
Current State of Play and Key Considerations for Issuers, in The International Comparative
Legal Guide to: Corporate Governance 23, 23–30 (12th ed. 2019), https://
www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/esg_in_the_us__current_state_of_play_and_key_considerations_for_issuers_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF9XFDN6] (summarizing ESG raters and methodologies); Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne
Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1921, 1930–35 (2020) (describing ESG investment options); Georg Kell, The
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Third and ﬁnally, these changes may be sparking further cultural
shift. As a sign of the general acceptance of value-enhancing ESG, consider
that during the 2019 proxy season, more than half of the shareholder proposals brought involved ESG issues, including topics such as disclosing climate change risk and increasing board diversity.302 These proposals are
not only being brought more regularly, they are also more likely to result
in favorable results for shareholder proponents and, speciﬁcally, voluntary
withdrawal in favor of negotiated settlements and greater overall support
for those proposals that go to a shareholder vote.303 In other words, the
evolution of CSR into value-enhancing ESG has propelled it into the
mainstream, as legal and market players no longer hinder but instead
amplify these efforts. This example reveals how the corporate governance
machine took a concept that was unlinked from shareholders, and
through law, institutions, and culture, reshaped it, and in so doing,
allowed it to thrive.
C.

Beneﬁt Corporations

To the extent a business wants to pursue proﬁts and a social purpose
that is inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization, it now has a
customized option: organize as a beneﬁt corporation. This new form of
business organization is a twenty-ﬁrst century reﬂection of how the
corporate governance machine has transformed CSR into an entirely
different form of corporation. Moreover, even the beneﬁt corporation is
subject to the forces of shareholder power, further demonstrating the
stickiness of the machine’s shareholderist orientation.
The beneﬁt corporation concept has been decades in the making as
partial legal measures along the way fell short.304 During the 1980s wave of
hostile takeovers, many states adopted constituency statutes designed to
insulate a corporation’s board of directors from breach of ﬁduciary duty

Remarkable Rise of ESG, Forbes (July 11, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/?sh=69fd0e7d1695
[https://perma.cc/PU8S-6QDZ] (noting that ESG is “now, quite literally, big business” with
“multi-billion dollar economic consequences”).
302. See Gary Larkin, On Governance: 2019 Proxy Season Was Huge for E&S Proposals,
Conf. Board (Sept. 9, 2019), https://conference-board.org/blog/environmental-socialgovernance/ES-Proposals-Proxy-Season [https://perma.cc/3HR6-YSNX]; Hannah Orowitz
& Brigid Rosati, An Early Look at the 2020 Proxy Season, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance (June 10, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/10/an-early-lookat-the-2020-proxy-season [https://perma.cc/6ED9-SNT8].
303. See Orowitz & Rosati, supra note 303; John D. Stoll, This Proxy Season, It’s Revenge
of the Nurdles, Wall St. J. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/this-proxy-seasonits-revenge-of-the-nurdles-11555074005 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
304. See Larry Hamermesh, Bart Houlahan, Rick Alexander & Dan Osusky, A
Conversation With B Lab, 40 Seattle U. L. Rev. 321, 329 (2017).
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suits for considering the impact of their decisions on stakeholders.305 Practically speaking, however, the existence of constituency statutes has not
made much difference in the governance of most traditional corporations.
States such as Delaware and California, home to the majority of public corporations and venture-backed startups, never adopted such statutes. And,
most signiﬁcantly, constituency statutes are merely permissive and do not
commit corporate boards to pursuing stakeholder interests.306
Against this background, corporate reformers decided to push for an
alternative. Around the same time that CSR was transformed into valuemaximizing ESG, a nonproﬁt corporation called B Lab pushed state
legislatures across the country to add a new form of business organization
to their corporate codes. B Lab emerged out of the social enterprise
movement and, speciﬁcally, through the grassroots efforts of former
business partners who came to believe that shareholder primacy was
fundamentally ﬂawed.307
Their ﬁrst initiative was to offer businesses the opportunity to apply
for certiﬁcation as a “B Corp,” a standard they invented to denote that a
company had scored highly on their self-created metrics for “good business” practices related to governance, workers, community, environment,
and customers.308 Subsequently, B Lab created model legislation for a new
form of corporation designed to pursue proﬁts as well as a social mission.309 Key features of the beneﬁt corporation model legislation include
a social purpose expressly stated in the charter, ﬁduciary duties requiring
directors to consider the effect of decisions on stakeholders, and regular
reporting obligations on social purpose activity.310 In many other respects,
however, the beneﬁt corporation model adopts features of the traditional
corporation. For example, shareholders have the power to elect the board
of directors and the right to sue to enforce ﬁduciary obligations; therefore,
a beneﬁt corporation’s protection from the corporate governance
machine is only as strong as the long-term commitment of its shareholders

305. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1228, 1231 (2004).
306. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes,
19 Pepp. L. Rev. 971, 987 n.86 (1992) (noting that “the legislatures saw the statutes as
making only minor changes in the law”). Some inﬂuential commentators advocated interpreting constituency statutes to allow consideration of stakeholders only to the extent consistent with existing law, which they stated as requiring shareholder primacy. ABA Comm.
on Corp. L., Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253, 2269
(1990).
307. Hamermesh et al., supra note 305, at 326.
308. Id.; see also Michael B. Dorff, Assessing the Assessment: B Lab’s Effort to Measure
Companies’ Benevolence, 40 Seattle U. L. Rev. 515, 523–26 (2017).
309. Model Beneﬁt Corporation Legislation, B Lab (Apr. 17, 2017), https://
beneﬁtcorp.net/sites/default/ﬁles/Model%20beneﬁt%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_1
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2F2-TVT3].
310. Brett H. McDonnell, Beneﬁt Corporations and Public Markets: First Experiments
and Next Steps, 40 Seattle U. L. Rev. 717, 720 (2017).
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to the stakeholder approach.311 Notably, these social entrepreneurs did
not attempt to change corporate governance from within the traditional
corporate form—they understood from previous business experiences and
corporate law advisors that shareholder primacy was deeply ingrained, and
they believed the path for change therefore lay outside of the existing
structure.
In 2010, B Lab succeeded in persuading their ﬁrst state, Maryland, to
adopt beneﬁt corporation legislation and expanded from there.312 Naturally, as they continued their campaign, the B Lab team had their sights
focused on Delaware.313 When B Lab pitched its legislation to the council
of the Delaware Bar Association that recommends changes to the corporate code, the response was predictably skeptical. As one lawyer explained,
“[O]ur initial reaction was that just sounds like this other constituency
statute thing that we rejected many years ago because we know how corporate law works.”314 When further pressed to consider such legislation, the
council’s task force came around to the view that even if not necessarily
“the best model,” allowing for private ordering was within the spirit of
Delaware’s approach.315 That is, the beneﬁt corporation could be one
choice among a menu of organizational options, with the traditional corporation remaining focused on shareholders and undisturbed in its
prominence.
This understanding helped catapult adoption of the beneﬁt corporation legislation to over thirty states, including Delaware, which adopted its
own, less stringent version.316 As a matter of culture and politics, the idea
of the beneﬁt corporation gained rare bipartisan support as state legisla-

311. A small number of beneﬁt corporations have gone public and in doing so some
have employed additional protections from outside shareholder interference, including
antitakeover provisions and dual-class stock, that are generally disfavored by the corporate
governance machine. See Ann Lipton, Beneﬁt Corporations Go Public, Bus. L. Prof
Blog (July 18, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/07/beneﬁtcorporations-go-public.html [https://perma.cc/6FWP-W3YR].
312. See B Lab, Maryland First State in Union to Pass Beneﬁt Corporation Legislation,
CSRwire (Apr. 14, 2010), https://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-FirstState-in-Union-to-Pass-Beneﬁt-Corporation-Legislation
[https://perma.cc/65BL-C6LA].
Beneﬁt corporation legislation has been enacted in over thirty states. B Corporation
Tracker,
Soc.
Enter.
L.
Tracker,
https://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps
[https://perma.cc/Q3D2-492E] (last updated Mar. 6, 2020).
313. Hamermesh et al., supra note 305, at 327.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 328.
316. See Frederick Alexander, Beneﬁt Corporation Law and Governance: Pursuing
Proﬁt With Purpose 87 (2018) (noting Delaware’s public beneﬁt corporation statute is “less
rigid” and gives “the choice to veer from . . . shareholder primacy, without giving up the key
elements of conventional governance” such as business judgment rule protection and “without imposing regulatory-like disclosure burdens”); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public
Beneﬁt Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 247, 250 (2014)
(noting Delaware’s public beneﬁt corporation statute is “less restrictive” than B Lab’s model
legislation).
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tors from different ends of the political spectrum supported either business as a force for social good or the freedom of entrepreneurs to engage
in private ordering of their business affairs.317 Not only that, market players
easily embraced a model that was aligned with shareholder value creation.318 Ultimately, however, the success of the beneﬁt corporation as a
separate business form reinforces the corporate governance machine’s
directional focus on shareholder interests for the vast majority of
companies.319
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE PATHS
The previous Parts provide a novel descriptive account of the system
of corporate governance that has reigned in the United States over the
past half century. We now turn to examining the broad implications of our
analysis for multiple pressing debates in corporate law. First, we explore
how the corporate governance machine shapes the development of corporate regulation in a predictable shareholderist direction. Beyond corporate purpose, we consider how the machine affects corporate governance
in other important ways, including by dampening incentives to innovate
and pushing public companies toward homogeneous governance structures. The latter observation also informs our conclusion that the existence of the corporate governance machine may be affecting incentives for
private companies to go public and, in so doing, affects the activities performed by public companies. We also reﬂect on what the existence of the
corporate governance machine reveals about the future of corporate governance and, in particular, the outlook for proponents of a stakeholder
governance system.
A.

Shaping the Development of Corporate Regulation

In the United States, for over a half century, corporate reform has
generally moved in one direction—toward advancing shareholder interests. Although there are counterexamples, the larger war has been won;

317. Hamermesh et al., supra note 305, at 328.
318. Id. at 358 (describing how major proxy advisory ﬁrms and institutional investors
were on board with the creation of B Lab to the extent it would “create [shareholder]
value”).
319. To date, approximately 3,000 beneﬁt corporations have been formed in the United
States, representing 0.05% of U.S. businesses. U.S. Census Bureau, 2019
Annual Business Survey–Company Summary (2019), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
table?tid=ABSCS2018.AB1800CSA04&hidePreview=true&nkd=EMPSZFI~001,ETH_GROU
P~001,RACE_GROUP~00,SEX~001,VET_GROUP~001 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (estimating approximately 5.7 million employer ﬁrms in the United States); B Corps
and
Beneﬁt
Corporations,
Urb.
Sustainability
Dirs.
Network,
https://
sustainableconsumption.usdn.org/initiatives-list/b-corps-and-beneﬁt-corporations
[https://perma.cc/FBE3-6CAT] (last visited Aug. 10, 2021) (reporting 3,000 U.S. beneﬁt
corporations).
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indeed, even the rules restricting shareholder rights and powers are justiﬁed as beneﬁtting them in aggregate. Our analysis provides an explanation
for this arc: The corporate governance machine forcefully dictates that
shareholders are the proper ends of corporate decisionmaking.
We can observe the inﬂuence of the machine in contemporary advocacy for corporate governance reform. Consider, for example, the issue of
ESG disclosures. Two prominent academics, Jill Fisch and Cynthia
Williams, have urged the SEC to require ESG disclosures for public companies.320 Rather than stating the request broadly in terms of disclosure
that would beneﬁt the public, Fisch and Williams contend instead that
ESG disclosures reveal information that would be material to the investing
public. This tendency to frame reform, and speciﬁcally corporate disclosures, to meet shareholder needs strikes some as overly narrow.321 Yet, as
the above discussion reveals, it is a wise strategic move in our existing system that prioritizes investor interests. The SEC, for instance, has faced
increasing calls for mandating climate-related disclosures. For a long
period, it maintained its status quo approach, emphasizing the materiality
standard as the core disclosure focus. Eventually, the SEC slightly opened
the door to change by welcoming “market participants” to assist it in
“better understanding how issuers and investors use environmental and
climate-related information to make capital allocation decisions.” 322
A similar pattern emerges in practice and soft law norms. For example, as voluntary ESG disclosure standards emerge and gain adherents, we
see the ﬂexible, shareholder-oriented SASB standards winning out in the
United States, despite the fact that tougher, more stakeholder-oriented
GRI standards are popular elsewhere and have existed longer.323 In turn,
320. Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Petition to SEC for Rulemaking on
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Disclosure, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp.
Governance (Oct. 9, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/09/petition-to-secfor-rulemaking-on-environmental-social-and-governance-esg-disclosure
[https://perma.cc/AC7R-8EQ5]; see also Virginia Harper Ho, Nonﬁnancial Risk Disclosure
and The Costs of Private Ordering, 55 Am. Bus. L.J. 407, 413 (2018) (arguing that mandatory ESG disclosure would serve the SEC’s mission of protecting investors, facilitating capital
formation, and promoting fair, orderly, and efficient markets).
321. See Lipton, Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, supra note 117, at 501–03.
322. Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize
and Enhance Financial Disclosures; Other Ongoing Disclosure Modernization Initiatives;
Impact of the Coronavirus; Environmental and Climate-Related Disclosure
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-mda-2020-01-30
[https://perma.cc/2RWX-KV39]. The current SEC Chair Gary Gensler has asked the SEC
staff to “develop a mandatory climate risk disclosure rule proposal” by the end of 2021,
emphasizing that many investors want this information. See Gary Gensler, Chair,
SEC, Prepared Remarks Before the Principles for Responsible Investment
“Climate and Global Financial Markets” Webinar (July 28, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/gensler-pri-2021-07-28 [https://perma.cc/6YMP-GHK6].
323. See Attracta Mooney & Billy Nauman, Larry Fink Rules on the Best Global
Standards for Climate Risk Reporting, Fin. Times (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/fc51227b-9d64-4e5a-b1e2-f6c07f4caa58 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review). The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the
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proxy advisors and ratings agencies have evolved to supply ESG metrics for
corporations and investors.324 These examples show that the machine is
slowly moving in the direction of incorporating stakeholder interests, on
the grounds that this is what investors want.325 This suggests that reform
couched in these terms has a real chance of success.
Despite the widening lens, however, this advocacy ultimately reinforces the corporate governance machine’s shareholderist orientation.326
For one, the fact that legal reformers work within the language and conceptual framing of shareholder primacy solidiﬁes the cultural understanding that corporations exist for the beneﬁt of their shareholders. Second,
to the extent that legal reforms strengthen shareholder power, this further
locks in the corporate governance machine’s orientation. Consider, for
example, Dodd–Frank’s say-on-pay mandate.327 This rule gave shareholders a nonbinding vote on executive compensation and in so doing also
ampliﬁed the role of proxy advisors who supply voting advice to meet
investor interests and consult corporations in structuring pay-for-performance compensation.328 Therefore, in addition to making management
subject to shareholder voice in this area, the rule further sustains players
who perpetuate the dynamics of the corporate governance machine.
B.

Pushing One-Size-Fits-All Governance

The operation of the corporate governance machine may have negative consequences for shareholders, as well as stakeholders. Despite the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) are organizations with the mission of developing
sustainability reporting standards. Id.
324. Hall & Huber, supra note 302, at 23.
325. Global trends toward investor stewardship and ESG disclosure requirements might
also encourage U.S. investors to integrate ESG measures. See Renaud Breyer & Laurent
Capolaghi, Key Impacts of the New ESG Disclosure Rules for the Fund Ecosystem, EY (Jan.
16, 2020), https://www.ey.com/en_lu/wealth-asset-management/luxembourg-marketpulse/esg---stewardship---key-impacts-of-the-new-esg-disclosure-rules[https://perma.cc/3FXJ-E85F] (discussing ESG transparency requirements on European
fund managers); see also UK Stewardship Code 2020, Fin. Reporting Council,
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/
Stewardship-Code_Dec-19-Final-Corrected.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z3V-JNN6] (last visited
Aug. 26, 2021) (establishing twelve stewardship principles for U.K. asset managers and asset
owners).
326. To the extent that shareholder value diverges from social welfare, the regulatory
trend presents troubling consequences. See Berger, supra note 152, at 666–67 (arguing that
“a stockholder primacy ideology means that corporate purpose generally will be decided by
what is in the interests of the top 10 percent income bracket in this country”); Bratton, The
Separation of Corporate Law and Social Welfare, supra note 44, at 788 (“[S]hareholder
value does not proxy for social welfare and no progress in that direction has registered
during the shareholder value era.”).
327. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2018)).
328. Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay:
Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 Cornell L.
Rev. 1213, 1231–32 (2012).
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lack of consensus about universal good governance practices, the corporate governance machine pushes many ﬁrms toward one-size-ﬁts-all governance solutions. These solutions are often embodied in corporate
governance codes adopted by industry groups, as well as the voting guidelines adopted by proxy advisors and major institutional investors.
According to these codes and guidelines, company governance
should be modeled after a set of best practices. These best practices
emphasize board independence, equal shareholder voting rights, executive compensation linked to performance, and governance structures that
enhance responsiveness to shareholders. And companies that do not fall
in line with these principles suffer consequences. For example, ISS recommends a no-vote for any company that has a staggered board.329 Inﬂuential
institutional investors further enforce these precepts through their voting
practices.330 As a result, the governance structure of most large U.S. public
companies looks nearly the same: annual director elections, majority voting, proxy access, no poison pill, and independent board leadership.331
The difficulty, of course, is that there is little evidence that maximum
accountability to shareholders is the right choice for every company—even
from the perspective of shareholder wealth maximization.332 Indeed, there
is evidence that one-size governance solutions can destroy value.333
329. James Cheap, Board Classiﬁcation and Diversity in Recent IPOs, Harv. L. Sch. F.
on Corp. Governance (Apr. 24, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/24/
board-classiﬁcation-and-diversity-in-recent-ipos/ [https://perma.cc/PWJ5-B8DZ] (citing
ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra note 283, at 18).
330. Colin J. Diamond & Michelle Rutta, BlackRock Publishes Updated Proxy Voting
Guidelines, White & Case (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/
alert/blackrock-publishes-updated-proxy-voting-guidelines [https://perma.cc/K2VP-22SJ]
(“BlackRock, like a growing number of other large institutional investors, intends to wield
its proxy voting power to inﬂuence corporate governance and management practices.”).
331. This effect is most pronounced for the largest U.S. companies. See Kosmas
Papadopoulos, Robert Kalb, Angelica Valderrama & Jared Sorhaindo, ISS, U.S. Board Study:
Board Accountability Practices Review 2 (2008), https://www.issgovernance.com/
ﬁle/publications/board-accountability-practices-review-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7FDVKMK] (“Governance practices between S&P 500 and the rest of the members of the S&P
1500 continue to differ signiﬁcantly. More importantly, the rate of governance change
between the two groups varies in many areas, as large-caps tend to adopt shareholderfriendly board accountability practices more quickly compared to smaller ﬁrms.”).
332. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Doron Levit, Irrelevance of Governance Structure 2–3
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 606/2019, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3340912 [https://perma.cc/9E2T-REUX] (“Almost every
aspect of corporate governance that was studied in the last forty years yielded conﬂicting
empirical ﬁndings, for instance: dual-class shares; anti-takeover defenses, such as poison
pills, staggered boards, and protective state legislations; and the strength of corporate
governance as measured by several indices.” (citation omitted)).
333. For example, there is evidence that mandatory board independence requirements
can harm ﬁrm value when applied to different companies. See Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D.
Daniel & Lalitha Naveen, Boards: Does One Size Fit All?, 87 J. Fin. Econ. 329, 351 (2008);
Onur Kemal Tosun, Changes in Corporate Governance: Externally Dictated vs Organically
Determined 28 (WBS Fin. Grp., Rsch. Paper No. 246, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3105695 [https://perma.cc/H5WE-PFTR]. Likewise, the stock market negatively
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Consider a technology company that is pursuing “moonshot” innovation that has never been done before and might require long periods of
gestation. That company might beneﬁt from greater insulation from investor pressure—a staggered board and perhaps even a dual-class structure—
in order to pursue its vision and secure the best long-term results.334 Or
consider a mature biotechnology company with complex products and
highly technical operations. That company faces substantial tradeoffs
when it brings an independent director on board; on the one hand, that
director may be less beholden to management, on the other, she may be
less likely to have industry-speciﬁc expertise or knowledge of the company’s operations. Indeed, the optimal board of directors for this company
from the perspective of shareholders might feature very few, if any, independent directors. The corporate governance machine, however, will push
the company toward adding a majority of independent directors, undermining the company’s optimal governance. Furthermore, other dynamics,
including the preferences or agency costs of intermediated investment,
may be at work when investors push for one-size-ﬁts-all governance
practices.335
Ultimately, this issue deserves additional study; here, we observe that,
to the extent that the operation of the corporate governance machine dictates a uniform governance blueprint for vastly different ﬁrms, it may
erode corporate value. Paradoxically, it also undermines the unfettered

reacts to companies that change their executive compensation practices before a
shareholder vote because of proxy advisor recommendations—indicating that such proxy
advisor recommendations (which tend to follow a one-size-ﬁts-all rubric) do not create
shareholder value. See Larcker et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting, supra note 185, at
173–204. Further, a study found that companies that separate the chairperson and CEO
roles in response to shareholder pressure likewise experience a lower valuation and reduced
operating performance. See Aiyesha Dey, Ellen Engel & Xiaohui Liu, CEO and Board Chair
Roles: To Split or Not to Split?, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 1595, 1613 (2011). Finally, researchers in
the United Kingdom have determined that companies that depart from default corporate
governance code provisions tend to perform better than those that comply with preset
defaults. Sridhar R. Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does Not Fit All, After All:
Evidence From Corporate Governance 18–20 (2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=887947
[https://perma.cc/6UMD-K3N6] (unpublished manuscript).
334. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 Yale L.J. 560, 579–83 (2016).
335. One might ask, for example, if one-size-ﬁts-all governance solutions destroy ﬁrm
value, why do institutional investors and their advocates support them? Diversiﬁed investors
may have incentives to support blanket practices that they expect will improve the value of
the portfolio as a whole. See generally Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, supra note 15
(describing how diversiﬁed investors should seek to minimize systematic risk to maximize
risk-adjusted returns). Or, these policies may be the product of agency costs if such institutional investors lack the time and incentive to develop ﬁrm-speciﬁc rules that would beneﬁt
investors. See Lund, Against Passive Shareholder Voting, supra note 178, at 516 (“[T]he
engagement teams do not use an active voting strategy and instead promulgate voting
guidelines and follow them closely.”).
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bargaining model that underpins shareholder primacy.336 A key premise
in the law and economics defense of shareholder primacy is that a corporation is a nexus of contracts and that parties can freely contract for rules
that are welfare-maximizing.337 But the path dependence that arises from
dogmatically equating certain shareholderist practices with good governance, and the inﬂuence of market players that proﬁt from establishing and
maintaining this playbook, may restrict the range of options that ﬁrms
adopt. Over time, this dynamic may limit the enabling nature of corporate
law that many scholars champion as welfare maximizing.
C.

Hampering Corporate Governance Innovation

The corporate governance machine’s emphasis on a platonic governance ideal leads to an additional and closely related result: It hampers
innovation in corporate governance. In other words, the corporate governance machine not only pushes corporations to adopt the same
governance blueprint, it also restricts the items that appear on the menu.
Corporate governance innovation has become relatively rare.338
Indeed, apart from the beneﬁt corporation, one of the last major innovations—the poison pill—was a brainchild of the 1980s designed to respond
to the increased risk of a hostile takeover.339 As the rest of this section
explains, the accompanying crackdown on its use was itself a product of
the nascent corporate governance machine. And it provides an example
of the lifecycle of innovations in corporate governance that do not ﬁt
cleanly within the shareholder primacy framework.
The ﬁrst poison pill was used in the early 1980s, at the advent of the
hostile takeover wave.340 Its rise in popularity kicked off a legal battle as to
whether its use was a proper exercise of board discretion. To convince the
Delaware Supreme Court of its propriety, the pro-management lawyers
who developed the pill went to great lengths to suggest that its use would
336. See Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance, supra note 276, at 33 (discussing
how the shareholder wealth maximization norm is a “bargained-for contract term” in the
contractarian model and rests “on the presumption of validity a free market society accords
voluntary contracts”).
337. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 12, 67–70 (“[W]e often speak of the
corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’ or a set of implicit and explicit contracts. This reference, too, is shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate
voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves.”).
338. Robert B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law Arises: Implications for the TwentyFirst Century, in The Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? 3, 3
(Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (providing an overview of
the key developments in corporate law over the nineteenth century and remarking that
corporate governance has remained stable since then).
339. Chase deKay Wilson, Marty Lipton’s Poison Pill, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., May 1984, at 10,
10–11.
340. Id.; see also William B. Chandler III, The Delaware Court of Chancery: An Insider’s
View of Change and Continuity, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 411, 413–14 (discussing the
history of the poison pill).
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beneﬁt shareholders, dubbing it a “shareholder rights plan,” and arguing
that its use was necessary to secure a fair offer for the company’s shares.341
The Delaware Supreme Court validated the pill, and companies continued
to adopt them.342 The popularity of the pill, however, sparked a wave of
pushback. Many academics, lawyers, proxy advisors, and investors decried
the use of a tool that they deemed entrenching.343 That was so despite the
fact that the empirical evidence about whether the poison pill beneﬁtted
shareholders was mixed.344 After being labeled a tool of “bad governance,”
poison pills have mostly fallen out of use at public companies as a matter
of standing governance.345 Even Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, the law
ﬁrm credited with the pill’s invention, noted in response to the COVID-19
pandemic and the corresponding resurgence in pills that “the negative
view of rights plans by the proxy advisory services and some institutional
investors” makes it generally inadvisable for companies to adopt a poison
pill without a speciﬁc threat.346
For another example of the issues that accompany governance innovation, consider the blowback against the use of dual-class stock. For the
past hundred years, dual-class stock has been used to respond to different
business concerns. For example, in the 1920s, bankers used differential
voting rights as a way of keeping control over the companies they took
public. Their argument was that the use of differential voting rights helped
control agency costs and signal managerial quality in an era with few disclosure requirements and weak investor protections.347 Dual-class stock has
since been used as a takeover defense, to keep control within families in
341. See Answering Brief of Defendants Below-Appellees at 60, Moran v. Household
Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (Nos. 37 & 47), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/
ﬁles/7383-a [https://perma.cc/VY59-ZL87].
342. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (validating the poison pill); Gerald F. Davis, Agents
Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the Intercorporate Network, 36
Admin. Sci. Q. 583, 585 (1991) (noting that by 1989, 60% of the Fortune 500 had poison
pills).
343. See, e.g., Emiliano M. Catan, The Insigniﬁcance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 2–3 (2019) (describing the demise of the preemptive poison pill); Ronald J.
Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 491,
506 (2001); D.L. Sunder, The Controversial ‘Poison Pill’ Takeover Defense: How Valid are
the Arguments in Support of It?, 23 NMIMS Mgmt. Rev. 47, 49–50 (2013).
344. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique
of the Scientiﬁc Evidence, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271, 336–39 (2000).
345. They typically exist only as a “shadow” option. Id.
346. David Katz & Sabastian V. Niles, Rights Plans (“Poison Pills”) in the COVID-19
Environment—“On the Shelf and Ready to Go”?, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/02/rights-plans-poison-pills-inthe-COVID-19-environment-on-the-shelf-and-ready-to-go [https://perma.cc/9LNX-USN7].
347. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Dual Class Common Stock: An Issue of Public and Private
Law, CLS Blue Sky Blog (Jan. 2, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/02/
dual-class-common-stock-an-issue-of-public-and-private-law
[https://perma.cc/48GP7BZY]; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, CLS Blue Sky
Blog (Nov. 19, 2018), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stockthe-shades-of-sunset [https://perma.cc/6HZQ-Y88K].
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family-owned companies, to protect the journalistic integrity of media
companies, and most recently, to keep control in the hands of visionary
technology company founders taking their companies public.348 And
despite these varied uses, the form of criticism that has followed each
iteration has been the same—that dual-class structures are antidemocratic
and lead to entrenchment and thus should be discouraged or even
prohibited.349
The pushback against the most recent wave of dual-class IPOs by technology companies provides an example of this dynamic in action. As companies began offering low-voting and nonvoting stock to public
shareholders—again, with the stated goal of promoting corporate value
and beneﬁtting shareholders in the long term—the corporate governance
machine began to work. In particular, proxy advisors, investor advocacy
groups, and prominent investors saw the use of dual-class stock as an
entrenching governance practice and began speaking out against it.350
These groups lobbied stock exchanges, stock indices, and the SEC, seeking
regulation limiting a company’s ability to issue differential shares. The
media also painted dual-class structures and nonvoting shares in a negative
light.351 Despite protestations by scholars and companies that differential
voting rights would sometimes beneﬁt shareholders, three major stock
index providers, including MSCI, FTSE Russell, and S&P Dow Jones, proposed to exclude prospective dual-class companies from their indices.352
Although agency theory adherents might celebrate this result as a win
for promoting shareholder democracy and minimizing managerial agency
costs, a less rosy view is that the corporate governance machine constrains
value-enhancing experimentation in governance when that innovation

348. See supra notes 210–212 and accompanying discussion.
349. See Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 210, at 692–93.
350. See, e.g., ISS, The Tragedy of the Dual Class Commons 3 (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/facebook0214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FQ4E-PLPE]; Dawn Lim, BlackRock, Calpers Want Exchanges to Clamp
Down Dual-Class Shares, Wall St. J. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrockand-calpers-to-stock-exchanges-clamp-down-on-dual-class-shares-1540394503 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Ross Kerber & Jessica Toonkel, T. Rowe Price to Oppose Key Directors
at Super-Voting Share Companies, Reuters (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-troweprice-directors/exclusive-t-rowe-price-to-oppose-key-directors-at-supervoting-share-companies-idUSKCN0W90F2 [https://perma.cc/6AY3-RKWN].
351. See, e.g., Kathleen Pender, Lyft Wants the Public’s Money, but Not Their Input,
S.F. Chron. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Lyftwants-the-public-s-money-but-not-their-13701367.php (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review); Kara Swisher, Opinion, You Can’t Fire Mark Zuckerberg’s Kid’s Kids, N.Y. Times
(Nov.
27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/opinion/tech-dual-classstock.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Welcome to the world of perpetual dualclass stock, an old ﬁnance trick that has been used — and now abused — with great
enthusiasm by the tech giants.”).
352. Pender, supra note 352. MSCI has since changed course. Id.
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threatens shareholder rights.353 And as before, this orientation undermines the enabling nature of corporate law that is often described as its
most desirable feature.354
D. Inﬂuencing the Public/Private Divide
A greater diversity of governance arrangements emerges in the private
company context, yet this observation also tells us something about the
corporate governance machine. Private companies regularly depart from
the corporate governance machine’s precepts: Many private companies
have unequal voting rights, founder-dominated boards, and other “bad
governance” characteristics.355 These governance arrangements have been
accepted as tolerable, or even necessary, to protect small, innovative companies with visionary founders or companies that wish to stay true to social
missions.356
This all changes once a company goes public: Newly minted public
companies are subject to heightened scrutiny from institutional investors,
ratings agencies, investor advocacy groups, stock exchanges, stock indices,
and proxy advisors. As a result, most private companies are forced to shed
the governance practices that shaped their early growth as soon as they
access the public markets.357 They must conform their boards to public
353. An optimal governance structure might, for example, take into account principal
costs as well as agency costs. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New
Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 796–98 (2017).
354. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 1 (1993)
(arguing that “[t]he genius of American corporate law is in its federalist organization” in
which “[f]irms choose their state of incorporation” and state corporate codes provide terms
“that function as default provisions in corporate charters that ﬁrms can tailor more precisely
to their needs”).
355. See Renee M. Jones, The Unicorn Governance Trap, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 165,
167, 179–82 (2017) (arguing unicorn companies present “governance problems”); Josh
Lerner & Ramana Nanda, Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation: What We Know
and How Much We Still Need to Learn 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 27492, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27492 [https://perma.cc/HR28-7L8C]
(arguing “founder-friendly” structures reﬂect “declining governance” of startups). See
generally Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155 (2019)
[hereinafter Pollman, Startup Governance] (describing venture capital contracting and the
governance of venture-backed startups).
356. See Yvon Chouinard, Let My People Go Surﬁng: Education of a Reluctant
Businessman 155 (2005) (“Being a publicly held corporation . . . would put shackles on how
we operate, restrict what we do with our proﬁts, and put us on a growth/suicide track. Our
intent is to remain a closely held private company, so we can continue to focus on our bottom line: doing good.”); Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 335, at 577–79 (discussing idiosyncratic vision); Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 356, at 181–83, 205 (discussing the
dynamics in which startup founders bargain for dual-class structures or other protections).
357. Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 356, at 209–10 (“Going public offers a
chance to unwind a complicated and largely contractual governance structure in favor of a
more traditional allocation of rights and responsibilities.”); see also Scott Kupor, Secrets of
Sand Hill Road: Venture Capital and How to Get It 160–61 (2019) (discussing how preferred
stock converts to common stock at IPO).
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company rules and norms regarding size and composition, such as those
favoring director independence.358 They must also deal with the reality
that they will be subject to the demands of a host of new shareholders that
are well positioned to use their governance rights to ensure alignment with
shareholder interests.359 Companies like Google and Facebook that maintain private-style governance in their voting structures are in the minority,
and even these companies face intense public scrutiny and pressures to
conform their practices.360
The insight that the corporate governance machine contributes to
this result is an important missing piece of the discussion about why companies are choosing to stay private longer. Previous scholarship has
focused on the availability of private capital, burdensome regulation and
disclosure requirements, the increased prospect of agency costs that
comes from a dispersed shareholder base, and increased litigation.361 The
corporate governance machine serves as another powerful deterrent for
companies that might otherwise access public markets sooner in their life
cycle—and one that is even more difficult to grapple with.362 Startups with
visionary leaders and market leverage have pushed for dual- or multiclass
structures to insulate themselves from the corporate governance
machine—and in so doing have been one of the few sources of governance
variation injected into public markets.
The corporate governance machine may also affect the balance of
whether certain activities are performed by large public companies rather
than smaller private ones. For example, there is evidence that emphasis
on shareholder value and accountability to shareholders renders public
companies less likely to invest in research and development relative to

358. See, e.g., David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Stanford Closer Look Series, Scaling Up:
The Implementation of Corporate Governance in Pre-IPO Companies 1 (2018),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/ﬁles/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-2018scaling-up-the-implementation-of-corporate-governance-in-pre-ipo-companies_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87WF-VLPQ] (discussing IPO “readiness” through the evolution of
corporate governance practices in private companies).
359. See Claudine Gartenberg & George Serafeim, 181 Top CEOs Have Realized
Companies Need a Purpose Beyond Proﬁt, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/08/181-top-ceos-have-realized-companies-need-a-purpose-beyondproﬁt (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding “lower levels of purpose (other than
shareholder wealth maximization) in publicly listed companies, relative to private firms”).
360. See, e.g., Mark Bergen, Tech Shareholder Activists Take Yearly Swing With
Renewed Hope, Bloomberg (June 2, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
newsletters/2021-06-02/tech-shareholder-activists-take-yearly-swing-with-renewed-hope (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
361. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of
the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445, 462 (2017) (discussing the literature on the costs
of public company status).
362. See Pollman, Startup Governance, supra note 356, at 215 (discussing “the
governance costs and liquidity pressure that develop in the extreme late stage of startups”).
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private companies.363 Investments in research and development do not
always pan out, and shareholders may prefer that excess cash be returned
to them rather than spent on speculative projects. Public companies might
embrace this cost-saving strategy despite the potential for investments in
research and development to fuel growth and innovation that produce
long-term social beneﬁts and strengthen sustainability in competitive
global market economies. In any case, the corporate governance
machine’s inﬂuence should be viewed as not only contributing to the
trend of companies staying private longer and pushing for dual-class
structures but also shaping the activity of those in the public realm.
E.

The Future of Corporate Governance

We have thus far examined a range of implications that arise from a
shareholderist-oriented corporate governance machine. In this ﬁnal part
of our discussion, we reﬂect on the future direction of the U.S. system of
corporate governance.
A central implication is that advocates of CSR or stakeholderism that
wish to see a move away from shareholder primacy will be frustrated by the
corporate governance machine. The diversity of corporate governance
systems around the world and the failure of the convergence hypothesis to
materialize demonstrate that a shareholder-dominated system is not
inevitable.364 Yet it has proven sticky in the United States and, as it has
permeated law, institutions, and culture, it has generated a reinforcing
momentum.365 Although our account does not answer whether
shareholder primacy is optimal, it opens the door to the view that the
corporate governance infrastructure that exists is the product of path
dependence, rather than efficient evolution. The fact that many
363. See John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment
and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 342, 358 (2015) (ﬁnding that public
ﬁrms invest less than a matched sample of private ﬁrms); Josh Lerner, Morten Sorensen &
Per Strömberg, Private Equity and Long-Run Investment: The Case of Innovation, 66 J. Fin.
445, 474–75 (2011) (documenting that ﬁrms that have gone private through leveraged
buyouts register patents that are more cited and more concentrated in important areas for
their portfolios).
364. For a sampling of the literature examining corporate governance divergence, see
Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation, supra note 84, at 676–78; Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 491 (1999); Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance,
supra note 255, at 1–3.
365. Japan presents an interesting parallel, where the law initially embraced a stakeholder model and eventually shifted to shareholder primacy, but cultural and institutional
forces have preserved the focus on stakeholders. See, e.g., Kana Inagaki, Spotlight Thrown
on Japan Inc.’s Stakeholder-Focused Model, Fin. Times (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/34faf1aa-e991-11e9-a240-3b065ef5fc55 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review). For another example of how institutions can reinforce a stakeholder
model, consider Germany and its codetermination model, which is protected and enhanced
by several complementary institutions. See Jens Dammann & Horst Eidenmüller,
Codetermination: A Poor Fit for U.S. Corporations, 2020 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 870, 878–86.
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institutional players proﬁt from the orientation of the machine and thus
serve as gatekeepers reinforces this view. And importantly, the institutional
framework substantially increases the cost of switching to a new paradigm.366
To understand why incremental change is unlikely to manifest a
major shift to stakeholderism, consider the following hypothetical
scenario: Imagine that the Delaware Supreme Court stated in a judicial
opinion that corporate ﬁduciaries could choose to sacriﬁce shareholder
returns (over the long and short term) to beneﬁt employees or the public
at large.367 Such a statement would end the doctrinal debate over
corporate purpose that has consumed much scholarly attention for the
past few decades. But with what effect? Will Amazon award a large share of
proﬁts to its warehouse workers? Will American Airlines stop producing
carbon emissions?
Additional legal discretion will not likely catalyze these changes. And
the corporate governance machine is largely to blame. In particular, management will likely predict that routine proﬁt-sacriﬁcing that is not widely
supported by investors and consumers is unlikely to increase the company’s stock price,368 and therefore, these actions could lead to a cascade
of negative consequences for the management team. Most directly, the
decision to put other groups ahead of shareholders could sacriﬁce management’s own compensation, which has become increasingly tied to the
company’s ﬁnancial performance as a result of pressure from the
machine’s institutional players. Perhaps even more importantly, the decision could attract negative attention from investors, especially if governance ratings agencies downgraded the company in the wake of the
move.369 Other shareholders might instead use their governance rights to
show disapproval such as by voting against executive pay at the next annual
meeting. Proxy advisors, too, would likely react unfavorably, directing
their shareholder clients to vote against management. Investor advocacy
366. See Roe, Chaos and Evolution, supra note 11, at 644–46. Not only that, changing
one part of a complementary system in an effort to improve it can cause the system to perform worse, not better, because the pieces no longer function as ﬂuidly. Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic
Organization, 9 Estudios Económicos 3, 12 (1994); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 Am.
J. Comp. L. 227, 239–40 (2011). This reality adds an additional barrier to change, as well as
additional reasons to be skeptical about the optimality of the system.
367. In some respects, this hypothetical is not far from existing doctrine as many scholars would already characterize corporate law as director-centric in terms of the balance of
managerial power and discretion afforded to boards of directors. See Bainbridge, Director
Primacy, supra note 3, at 550; Blair & Stout, supra note 90, at 251.
368. Prosocial corporate activity that is widely supported by investors and consumers is
unlikely to have a negative effect on the company’s stock price and might even increase it.
See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1617,
1641 n.105 (2021) (discussing the example of Dick’s Sporting Goods and its decision to stop
selling guns, which ended up boosting revenue).
369. See supra section II.B.7.
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groups would similarly protest any move that downgraded shareholder
value. And if the company continued to make signiﬁcant prosocial proﬁtsacriﬁcing choices into the future, it is likely that inﬂuential investors with
concentrated investments in the company would do more, or activists
would take positions to do so. For example, those investors could wage a
proxy ﬁght until management changed course or was replaced with
individuals who were better aligned with shareholder interests.370
Put simply, legal discretion is not enough to broadly change corporate
behavior if the other components of the corporate governance machine
remain intact. Although investors are increasingly choosing ESG investment vehicles, and some are even engaging in ESG activism, there remains
a link between the prosocial action that investors demand and value maximization.371 By contrast, to regularly sacriﬁce proﬁts to beneﬁt the public,
a company’s management would need insulation from shareholders, but
this insulation is anathema to the corporate governance machine and is
not the norm.372 Although shareholder primacy has come under pressure
in our cultural understanding of how companies should operate, at the
end of the day, “good governance” continues to be deﬁned by its link to
accountability to shareholders.373 It is not clear that the growing cultural
acceptance of an enlightened approach toward stakeholders will put out
the shareholder primacy ﬁre that fuels the corporate governance machine,
although it may substantially impact its evolution.
The key point is that as the shareholder primacy viewpoint has
become enmeshed in our cultural and institutional understanding of good
governance and as multiple powerful players operate as gatekeepers for
the shareholder primacy norm, it becomes difficult to move to another
370. See Hart & Zingales, supra note 17, at 260.
371. For example, the successful proxy ﬁght that ESG investor Engine No. 1 waged at
Exxon Mobil was couched in terms of long-term performance. See Justin Baer & Dawn Lim,
The Hedge-Fund Manager Who Did Battle With Exxon—and Won, Wall St. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-hedge-fund-manager-who-did-battle-with-exxonandwon-11623470420?mod=hp_lead_pos10 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last
updated June 12, 2021) (quoting Engine No. 1’s manager that “the stock should go up” if
its proposed strategy for the company is “right”); Stephen Bainbridge, The ExxonMobil
Proxy Fight Was Not a Triumph for Woke Capitalism, ProfessorBainbridge.com (June 14,
2021),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2021/06/theexxonmobil-proxy-ﬁght-was-not-a-triumph-for-woke-capitalism.html
[https://perma.cc/a2c8-phdb] (“Engine No.1’s arguments were focused on ExxonMobil’s
subpar ﬁnancial performance, emphasizing that over the preceding ten years ExxonMobil
had lost money while stock market indices had tripled.”).
372. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text; see also Mark J. Roe, Corporate
Purpose and Corporate Competition (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No.
601/2021, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3817788 [https://perma.cc/H8DX-9DPP]
(“[I]n competitive markets, the proﬁt-oriented but purpose-pressured ﬁrm has no choice
but to refuse the purpose pressure (or to give it only lip service), while in monopolisticallyorganized industries, the purpose-pressured ﬁrm has more room to maneuver.”).
373. See supra notes 79–83, 216–220 and accompanying text; see also Kastiel & Nili,
supra note 287 (describing good governance in these terms).
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paradigm—one that gives power to other stakeholders or allows corporate
executives to make decisions based on the corporate entity, overall social
value, or something else.374 This observation raises questions about the
optimality of the system—it could be that path dependence leads us to the
efficient result, but that result is not guaranteed.375 More important, without a substantial shock to the system, such as a federal chartering requirement directing companies to adopt a stakeholder governance model that
would cause a shift across multiple institutions at once,376 stakeholderism
is unlikely to dethrone shareholder primacy as the dominant
decisionmaking framework.
Instead, the corporate governance machine will push stakeholder
advocates to ﬁt their models into the existing infrastructure. This development has already begun to take place. For example, stakeholder advocates
emphasize that consideration of stakeholder welfare is necessary for corporate proﬁt maximization over the long term. As shifts in understanding
occur regarding the merits of various ESG initiatives and better metrics
develop for measuring these beneﬁts, a greater level of stakeholder interests can be reconciled with pursuing long-term shareholder value. Not
only that, some observers have urged corporations to consider shareholder value more holistically, recognizing that shareholders are individuals with diverse preferences. And because these “enlightened”
shareholder primacy perspectives incorporate stakeholder interests into
shareholderism, they are likely to make it through the corporate
governance machine and spread widely.
But although an enlightened shareholder value approach allows for
greater consideration of stakeholder welfare, it ultimately serves only a partial victory to advocates of stakeholderism. In particular, tying the consideration of stakeholder welfare to long-term shareholder value limits
acceptable rationales and favors activity that can be reduced to measurable
metrics tied to risk or ﬁnancial value. It also renders the promotion of
stakeholder welfare that cannot be justiﬁed as beneﬁtting shareholders as
outside the bounds of acceptable corporate activity, no matter the overall
welfare beneﬁts.
The acceptance of an enlightened shareholder value approach also
means that the corporation’s social conscience may be externally determined. Take sexual harassment as an example. The success of the #metoo
374. See supra note 366.
375. See Roe, Chaos and Evolution, supra note 11, at 646–52 (explaining that the “original path does not have to be very strong for it to explain how we got to where we are”).
376. See, e.g., Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018) (sponsored by
Sen. Elizabeth Warren). This proposed legislation could throw sand in the gears of the
machine by mandating sweeping corporate governance changes including requiring
employee representatives to serve on the board, requiring federal charters for large corporations, and giving directors the duty to create a general public beneﬁt. Id. As a result, legal
and private institutional gatekeepers would be forced to change in line with these new legal
requirements.
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movement has created a business case for sexual harassment prevention,377
but before 2017, such socially desirable corporate activity was often
neglected. Without this external pressure, there was no impetus for
change, regardless of the social beneﬁts. Simply put, tying a company’s
obligation to engage in socially beneﬁcial conduct to value maximization
means that important issues may slip through the cracks.
Not only that, the corporate governance machine will likely affect the
future path of corporate ESG. As discussed, surviving the corporate governance machine requires the embrace of its institutional players. ESG can
create business opportunities for many of them, particularly proxy advisors, stock exchanges, and ratings agencies. As such, these market players
are likely to embrace ESG activities that can be easily measured and scored,
for investor and perhaps even public consumption. This in turn will shape
the types of ESG activities that companies choose to engage in. And over
time, as market players continue to develop metrics and products for companies at scale, corporate ESG activities are likely to coalesce around
standard practices or take a one-size-ﬁts-all form, too.
As one example of this progression, consider board diversity. In the
past few years, a number of market participants have made gender diversity
a priority.378 For example, in 2017, the inﬂuential investor State Street
promised to vote against nominating directors of companies that lacked
any female directors.379 BlackRock subsequently announced that it
expected its portfolio companies to each have at least two female directors.380 In response to these and other efforts, hundreds of companies
added one or two female directors to their boards.381 Despite gender

377. See Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118
Colum. L. Rev. 1583, 1612 (2018) (discussing the ways in which sexual harassment can
impair corporate proﬁtability).
378. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 2018 Proxy Season Review 23 (2018),
https://www.sullcrom.com/ﬁles/upload/SC-Publication-2018-Proxy-Season-Review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G33G-BLHW] (describing efforts to increase gender diversity on boards
made by a proxy advisor, institutional investors, and advocacy groups).
379. Joann S. Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against Companies
That Don’t Have Women Directors, Wall St. J. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/state-street-says-it-will-start-voting-against-companies-that-dont-have-womendirectors-1488862863?mod=article_inline (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
380. Sarah Krouse, BlackRock: Companies Should Have At Least Two Female Directors,
Wall St. J. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-companies-should-haveat-least-two-female-directors-1517598407 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
381. Amy Whyte, State Street to Turn Up the Heat on All-Male Boards, Inst. Inv. (Sept.
27, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1b4fh28ys3mr9/State-Street-toTurn-Up-the-Heat-on-All-Male-Boards [https://perma.cc/6NED-VC5P]; see also John
Pavlus, Companies Are Adding More Women to Their Boards. What’s Driving the Change?,
KelloggInsight (May 3, 2021), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/womencompany-boards [https://perma.cc/TG48-HMEP] (discussing research ﬁnding that “the
Big Three” were drivers of increase in board diversity and “[t]he way a company changed
their board corresponds to who holds large ownership stakes in them, and what those
speciﬁc asset managers were pushing for”).
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diversity increasing on corporate boards, women remain underrepresented on boards and in other key leadership positions such as CEO.382
Further, market players did not initially focus on other aspects of diversity,
and those aspects remained neglected.383 More recently, market players
and lawmakers have begun to turn their attention to efforts aimed at
increasing racial and ethnic diversity on corporate boards.384 In particular,
the SEC has approved a Nasdaq requirement seeking to encourage listed
companies to advance the diversity of directors who self-identify as an
underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+.385 Although there are many reasons to applaud these efforts, the constraints of an enlightened shareholder value approach may increase the possibility that companies will
comply in a minimal or check-the-box fashion without taking a critical look
at whether their boards and the rest of their workforce are truly diverse
and inclusive.386
In sum, the legacy of the corporate governance machine is not just
the continued constraint of corporate activity in the service of shareholder
welfare, but also the co-optation of stakeholderism. The desirability of this
reality is subject to much debate, but as our analysis indicates, wholesale

382. See Andie Kramer, Where Are All The Women Directors?, Forbes (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andiekramer/2020/03/20/where-are-all-the-womendirectors/?sh=4ea41c229b89 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that only 20%
of directors of Russell 3000 companies are women and 20% of companies in the Russell
3000 have no women directors); see also Women Bus. Collaborative, C200 & Catalyst,
Women CEOs in America: Changing the Face of Business Leadership 8 (2020),
https://womenceoreport.org/the-report/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (ﬁnding
that 5.2% of Russell 3000 CEOs are women, an “all-time high” of 7.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs
are women, and less than 1% are women of color).
383. See Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty and Diversity, 75 Vand. L. Rev. 1
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
10),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3788159
[https://perma.cc/C4XF-BADL] (noting that “focus on the composition of boards [in
recent decades] has not translated into boards representative of our nation”); Lisa M.
Fairfax, Racial Reckoning With Economic Inequities: Board Diversity as Symptom and
Partial Cure, 106 Cornell L. Rev. Online (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 14) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (“The lack of board diversity is a visible symptom of a
signiﬁcant problem that corporate America has failed to solve.”).
384. See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 2020 Proxy Season Review: Part 1—Rule 14a-8
Shareholder Proposals 27–29, (2020), https://www.sullcrom.com/ﬁles/upload/
SC-Publication-2020-Proxy-Season-Review-Part-1-Rule-14a-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/R64FR3SU] (describing activity related to racial and ethnic diversity on boards through initiatives
by institutional investors, the SEC, Congress, and the California state legislature).
385. Rules Related to Board Diversity, Exchange Act Release No. 34-92590, 86 Fed. Reg.
44,424, 44,424–25 (Aug. 6, 2021).
386. See Brummer & Strine, supra note 384, at 18, 38 (observing that the “gap in representation . . . jumps at every step across the corporate hierarchy” and “diversity can only
be operationalized as an organizational feature if it is accompanied by an equitable and
inclusive culture”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old
Story, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 855, 859 (2011) (arguing that “the business case, standing alone, is
insufficient to ensure enhanced diversity in the boardroom” and highlighting “the
important role that social and moral justiﬁcations must continue to play in such efforts”).
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change away from this model is unlikely to manifest in the foreseeable
future absent a substantial shock to the system.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the complex and reinforcing nature of the U.S. corporate governance system is essential for understanding corporate decisionmaking and how to reform it. Our descriptive account of the corporate
governance machine has wide-ranging implications for multiple conversations in corporate law, and the debate over corporate purpose in particular. Indeed, as the cultural conversation has turned to increasingly vocal
calls for reorientation of purpose away from shareholder primacy, our
analysis sheds light on the complexity of this project. As shareholder primacy has evolved from a rule to a system, it has generated a reinforcing
momentum. In particular, the institutional framework that encompasses
the corporate governance machine substantially increases the costs associated with moving to a new paradigm. As such, stakeholderism is unlikely
to dethrone shareholder primacy; however, it may gain ground by shaping
the meaning of shareholder primacy to encompass stakeholder interests.
Indeed, this may well be the legacy of the corporate governance machine
over the long-term: Even when the traditional shareholder primacy viewpoint no longer wins the day, the apparatus that it generated will continue
to inﬂuence the path of corporate conduct and legal reform for years to
come.

